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    ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This thesis first critically analyzes John Rawls’s second principle of justice as a 
democratic conception of equality and the challenge posed to that conception by Ronald 
Dworkin’s ‘Equality of Resources.’ Democratic equality is defended over luck 
egalitarianism as an articulation of liberal egalitarianism. However, where Rawls deems 
social primary goods to be unconditionally regulated by institutions, Rawls is largely 
silent about the fair assignment of costs and burdens that correspond to the fair provision 
of opportunities and primary goods. Dworkin’s notion of ’opportunity costs’ is argued to 
improve on the role of responsibility in democratic egalitarianism by making clear that 
the provision of primary goods creates costs and burdens within a system of social 
cooperation. The second section illustrates this argument by considering claims to self-
government by Canadian Aboriginals. By formulating a distributive criterion that treats 
Aboriginal self-government as a primary good, I show that claims of culture and identity 
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 Introduction   
 
 Since John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, much progress has been achieved in 
clarifying the normative aims of distributive equality. Rawls’s extension of a starting-gate 
ideal of equality of opportunity (EO) to a broader theory of fair equality of opportunity 
(FEO) that seeks to mitigate the influence of undeserved circumstances has in particular 
been the object of intense critical scrutiny. Though much clarity has been achieved, and a 
greater range of egalitarian theories is now available, the role of responsibility in a 
political theory of equality remains controversial.  
 Throughout this thesis, EO will refer to starting-gate conceptions of equality. 
Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity, which I will refer to as FEO, is part of what Rawls 
labels a democratic conception of equality. FEO is to be contrasted with EO in the 
following way. EO favors efficient outcomes benefiting everyone so long as institutions 
secure a competitive principle of careers open to talents. This is argued to ensure the 
fairness of distributive outcomes whatever overall allocation results because under EO, 
background conditions confer responsibility on individuals for the use of their 
opportunities and share of scarce valuable resources. Rawls rejects EO as an adequate 
articulation of equality and as properly accounting for the influence of undeserved factors 
on distributive outcomes. For Rawls, institutions ought to play a greater role in regulating 
the conditions under which individuals pursue available opportunities and life chances.  
Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Equality of Resources,’ which in Will Kymlicka’s words 
seeks, “a distributive scheme that respects the moral equality of persons by compensating 
for unequal circumstances while holding individuals responsible for their choices,”1 
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provides a complex criticism of Rawls’s FEO. On this view, it follows that individuals 
are responsible for their social position and resources only when background conditions 
eliminate the influence of arbitrary factors on the distribution of resources and track 
individual ambition: an endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive distribution. 
According to Kymlicka, Dworkin’s theory better fulfills the basic aim of Rawls’s theory. 
Indeed, according to G.A. Cohen, “Dworkin has, in effect, performed for egalitarianism 
the considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal 
of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility.”2 This thesis is centrally 
concerned with the challenge posed by Dworkin’s equality of resources to a democratic 
conception of equality. The main argument of this thesis is that while Dworkin’s two 
mechanisms, the auction and the insurance scheme, are impracticable and, in any case, 
undesirable, Dworkin’s notion of ‘opportunity costs’ is compatible with and improves 
upon the role of responsibility in Rawls’s democratic conception of equality. By 
‘opportunity costs’ I mean the distribution of burdens and costs that correspond to the 
provision of social primary goods, in other words, the social and financial costs of 
providing fair conditions of equality and fair distributive outcomes. 
In Part One I critically analyze the three parts of Rawls’s second principle of 
justice - FEO, the difference principle and social primary goods - and assess whether 
critics are right to charge that that principle is deficient regarding the role of 
responsibility. In particular, I assess and reject the claim by Dworkin and Cohen, and 
defended by Kymlicka, that Rawls insufficiently spells out the normative aim of 
mitigating the influence of undeserved circumstances on distribution. I then outline the 
two main mechanisms Dworkin uses to articulate an ambition-sensitive and endowment-
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insensitive distribution in his essay ‘Equality of Resources,’ namely, the auction and the 
insurance scheme. However, Elizabeth Anderson, a democratic egalitarian, makes 
explicit the contrast between democratic equality and what she labels Dworkin’s luck 
egalitarianism.  
After considering Anderson’s criticisms of Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism, I argue 
that Dworkin’s equality of resources cannot fulfill its own aims: the rationality of the two 
mechanisms is far too specific to serve the normative commitment to equality required 
for a liberal democratic politics. However, Dworkin’s notion of ‘opportunity costs’ is 
more complex than Anderson acknowledges and indeed captures much of what is at stake 
in contemporary democratic politics. In particular, I argue that Dworkin’s major 
contribution to egalitarian theory is to make explicit the financial and social costs of 
securing fair shares of social primary goods. 
Indeed, a major feature of democratic equality, as defended by Rawls and 
Anderson, is the claim of citizens to a set of unconditionally regulated social primary 
goods. In order to show that Rawls’s account of responsibility is not deficient, I examine 
Rawls’s account of how primary goods give responsibility an embedded role in a theory 
of democratic equality, what Rawls labels a social division of responsibility. In fact, on 
the basis of a distinction made by Michael Blake and Mathias Risse between ‘direct’ 
theories of distributive justice, of which Dworkin’s is an example, and Rawls’s ‘indirect’ 
theory of distributive equality, I reject Dworkin, Cohen, and Kymlicka’s claims that an 
individual notion of responsibility is continuous with Rawls’s FEO. However, Dworkin's 
notion of opportunity costs makes explicit a deficiency in Rawls's account of primary 
goods and social division of responsibility, namely, that claims of justice create costs and 
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burdens within a system of social cooperation. Rawls is largely silent about the fair 
assignment of costs and burdens that correspond to the fair provision of opportunities, 
expectations and primary goods.   
Part Two attempts to illustrate the democratic features of Dworkin’s notion of 
opportunity costs. In order to provide an illustration of how Dworkin’s notion of 
opportunity costs might play a distinct role in resolving contemporary democratic 
challenges to the basic structure, I incorporate into my analysis a major criticism of 
Rawls. Kymlicka builds a liberal case for culture as a primary good, arguing that self-
determination for national minorities is a fundamental case of justice consistent with 
Rawls’s egalitarianism. However, Kymlicka also defends a practical institutional 
argument about equal access to a societal culture, the institutions required to sustain the 
right to self-determination. 
Taking the case of Canadian Aboriginals, I argue in that both luck egalitarianism 
and Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights express insufficiently what is at stake in the 
claims of a national minority for self-government. I then analyze a recent string of 
Canadian Supreme Court decisions showing a strong link between cultural recognition 
and a unique, or sui generis right to land and property. It quickly becomes clear that we 
need an account not only of the financial but also the social opportunity costs of minority 
self-government since the social, political and economic institutions of the majority are 
also at stake.  
In accordance with a democratic view of equality, I identify two sets of primary 
goods at stake to Canadian Aboriginals: the devolution of opportunities, authority, and 
responsibility to independent institutions, and the democratic conditions of autonomy 
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under which those goods are to be provided, namely, as members of a multinational 
citizenship. Ultimately, I formulate a two-part distributive criterion that I believe largely 
resolves the tension between democratic claims to equality by Aboriginal communities in 
Canada and the demand for attention to the opportunity costs of self-government as 
members of a multinational state. The devolution of powers and goods to Aboriginal 
institutions must reasonably be tied to the capacity to govern as a nation; recognition of 
nationhood ought to be tied to socioeconomic conditions, or a standard of living, not 
lower than the least-advantaged social position of the majority culture, Canadian society. 
This criterion is not intended as a principle of justice nor is its formulation intended to 
provide an independent argument of the conditions of democratic equality. In accordance 
with the main argument, the aim is simply to illustrate how Dworkin’s notion of 
responsibility can be productively applied to the provision of primary goods. A secondary 
and related concern is to argue that recognition theorists need to consider more carefully 












 1.A. Conceptions of Equality 
 
 The theories discussed attempt to improve on a commonly accepted principle of 
justice, equality of opportunity (EO), that, as Roemer states, in one form or another is 
probably the most universally accepted conception of justice. The simplest form of EO, 
known as the starting-gate theory, or level playing-field conception of equality, relies 
almost exclusively on the potential of market exchanges to distribute benefits and 
burdens among individuals. That is, the distribution of rewards and costs is fair when, 
“there are no constraints on the structure of opportunities generated by free markets.”3  
 Since Rawls, starting-gate conceptions of EO have been challenged by various 
conceptions of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). Rawls’s understanding of FEO falls 
under what Rawls labels ‘justice as fairness’, which is captured by a set of principles: 1. 
An equal scheme of rights and liberties which are to be guaranteed their fair value; 2.A. 
Social and economic inequalities must be attached to positions and offices open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; 2.B. Inequalities are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society.4 Rawls arranges these principles 
lexically, that is, in order of priority; a lower principle cannot be fulfilled before a higher 
one. Other than 2.B., also called the difference principle, these principles are familiar 
within liberal democracies, and Rawls believes his ordering of all three principles best 
reflects the weight attached to each within those societies. 
 An equal scheme of liberties is a feature of any plausible understanding of 
liberalism. What is disputed is how these rights are to be protected and fulfilled. For the 
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purposes of this thesis, I will leave aside any very detailed discussion of equal liberties or 
rights. It suffices to say that Rawls’s understanding of rights apply to the basic structure 
of a society. Unlike the simple view of EO that focuses on one institutional relationship, 
state and market, the basic structure involves the total institutional arrangements of a 
political society, including the, “rules and practices that define the political constitution, 
legal procedures and the system of trials, the institution of property, the laws and 
conventions which regulate markets and economic production and exchange, and the 
institution of the family.”5 The reason for focusing on the institutional arrangements, 
argues Rawls, is due to the profound and pervasive influence of those institutions on and 
over the course of the lives of persons, their ambitions, expectations and opportunities. 
As Rawls argues, it is, "[t]his structure [which] favors some starting places over others in 
the division of the benefits of social cooperation."6 As we will see however, the focus on 
institutions does not exclude the dispositions or identities of persons. In fact, as Rawls 
himself came to argue increasingly in his later work, in particular, Political Liberalism, 
there is a tension between the inequalities produced by the institutional structure, which 
principles of justice are to regulate, and an ideal characterization of the relations among 
free and equal citizens. That is, Rawls now argues that where his distributive theory 
‘justice as fairness’ applies to the basic structure, that basic structure is now seen to 
depend crucially on fair terms of social cooperation between citizens that endure over 
time. In particular, Rawls argues that the distributive arrangements of a society depend on 
the extent to which persons understand each other as free and equal citizens: free, “in the 
sense that they regard both themselves and each other as having a conception of the good, 
and as entitled to make claims on their political institutions to be in a position to advance 
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their respectively own conception of the good,” and equal, “in the sense that they are 
capable of engaging in social cooperation over a complete life as one among equal 
citizens.”7 I do not intend to resolve this tension between justice as fairness and political 
liberalism. The point I wish to emphasize in this thesis is that Rawls’s concern with 
sustaining fair terms of social cooperation over time complicates the role FEO is to play 



















1.B. Meritocratic to Democratic Equality    
 
 As Kymlicka interprets Rawls’s principle of FEO, “it is fair for individuals to 
have unequal shares of social goods if those inequalities are earned and deserved by the 
individual, that is, if they are the product of the individual’s actions and choices. But it is 
unfair for individuals to be disadvantaged or privileged by arbitrary and undeserved 
differences in their social circumstances.”8 It is worth analyzing this account of Rawls’s 
FEO since in TJ Rawls explicitly rejects desert as a basis for entitlement and indeed the 
fairness of a meritocratic society.  
 Rawls argues that the problem with EO is that distributive outcomes are at any 
given time strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies. In one of his most 
well-known and controversial accounts of inequality, Rawls claims that, “[t]he existing 
distribution of income and wealth,... is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of 
natural assets - that is, natural talents and abilities - as they have been developed or left 
unrealized, and their use favored or disfavored over time by social circumstances and 
such chance contingencies as accident and good fortune.”9 But why should we assume 
that existing inequalities follow from chance? What reasons do we have to see existing 
inequalities as necessarily arising unfairly from undeserved advantages, especially in 
light of the opportunities afforded by a thriving free market? Rawls provides a very 
strong assessment of market distributions. But to see how Kymlicka’s interpretation of 
Rawls's FEO is flawed, we must look at Rawls‘s position in some detail. 
 Rawls equates meritocracy with the idea that an individual’s social position, 
wealth and income depend on undeserved natural and social circumstances, which are 
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then used to justify rights and privileges of authority for unequal social positions. In a 
free market system, social positions that depend on such circumstances result in unjust 
disparities between social classes. EO's principle 'careers open to talents' seeks to 
mitigate the extent to which distributive shares depend on social contingencies such as 
race, class, and family. But as Rawls states: “[t]here is no more reason to permit the 
distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than 
by historical and social fortune.”10 Once we are troubled by the influence of one, we are 
bound on reflection to be troubled by the other; according to Rawls, the two seem equally 
arbitrary. Specifically, the extent to which capacities develop and even the willingness to 
make a deserving effort is affected by all kinds of social conditions into which we are 
born. So even though EO rectifies meritocratic inequalities by upholding legal barriers 
against discrimination, Rawls argues that EO allows the unfair influence of social and 
natural contingencies on access to social positions and resources over time, the 
cumulative result of which is, “an equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the 
personal quest for influence and social position,”11 and wealth. 
 Rawls’s proposal is that background conditions must do more than promote 
nondiscrimination in the pursuit of positions of authority, careers and personal advantage. 
According to FEO, some form of redistribution or compensation is required to mitigate 
the influence of undeserved social and natural circumstances that generate unfair 
disparities. That is, rules regulating the influence of social circumstances and natural 
endowment, as well as the rules governing competition, are a concern for a theory of 
equality. In Norman Daniels’s words, FEO, “requires that we not only judge people for 
jobs and offices by reference to their relevant talents and skills, but that we also establish 
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institutional measures to correct for the ways in which class, race, and gender might 
interfere with the normal development of marketable talents and skills.”12 The 
institutional structure should not only work actively to create conditions of fair market 
competition for valuable social offices and positions, but should work to level a range of 
existing social and natural circumstances that affect the ability of disadvantaged social 
groups to compete for those positions in the first place.  
 Despite this analytical distinction, Andrew Mason argues that these two forms of 
equality are so intimately linked that, “we cannot give a justification of the meritocratic 
view that does not draw upon some broader account of equality of opportunity or 
justice.”13 To illustrate, consider a white candidate applying to a workforce prejudiced 
against blacks. In this case, being white ought not to count as a qualification for a job, yet 
this may be consistent with notions of merit that Rawls’s FEO rejects. We need a way to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate ways of distinguishing persons and EO is meant 
to provide further guidance here. But while a rejection of EO for a theory of FEO has 
been used to justify affirmative action, that rejection does not necessarily lead to 
compensatory background conditions or redistribution. The point is that neither 
performance-related criteria nor fair background conditions constrain the favoring of 







1.C. Natural Endowments  
 
 While compensatory background institutions can feasibly mitigate the influence 
of unequal social circumstances, the distribution of natural assets - endowments - is 
largely beyond the control of institutions. This would seem to limit the role of institutions 
in mitigating their influence. According to Rawls, however, the difference principle 
transforms in fundamental respects the aims of a society in which endowment differences 
influence distribution. Examining the extent to which the difference principle transforms 
the meritocratic principle of desert, of greater gains for greater endowment, provides part 
of the basis for understanding Dworkin’s critique of Rawls, and the extent to which 
Rawls’s account of primary goods does or does not provide an adequate role for 
responsibility.   
 On the one hand, inequalities arising from talents are clearly arbitrary, the result 
of what Rawls calls natural fortune. Specifically, Rawls's claim is that natural 
endowments are arbitrary in the sense that the effect of their influence on distributive 
shares is ‘undeserved.’ On the other hand, because the distribution of endowments is 
largely beyond the control of institutions to regulate, Rawls acknowledges that 
distributive inequalities are bound to arise from unequal natural endowment.   
 According to Rawls, then, although arbitrary, the advantages and benefits arising 
from natural endowments, skills and talents, are not necessarily undeserved; that is, “the 
more advantaged [in talent] are entitled to whatever they can acquire in accordance with 
the rules of a fair system of social cooperation [emphasis added].”14 Rawls’s 
understanding of ‘fair’ in an ideal characterization of the terms of social cooperation 
 12
characterizing the basic structure, and how that term distinguishes Rawls’s conception of 
equality from EO, is complex and will take up a great deal of the discussion in Part 1 of 
this thesis. At present, however, there are two senses in which Rawls argues the influence 
of talents is allowed by the principles of justice. First, according to Rawls, distributive 
inequalities arising from differences in talent would be allowed in a society in which 
natural endowments are viewed as crucial to the integrity of persons protected by the 
basic liberties. Talents ought legitimately to play a role in shaping the opportunities made 
available to individuals and in forming their identities within a social system. Second, 
although both EO and FEO allow inequalities that result from differences in endowments, 
one way Rawls distinguishes a democratic society from a meritocracy is the democratic 
concern with reciprocity among its members. As Rawls states, in a democratic society, 
just as, “it is not in general to the advantage of the less fortunate to propose policies 
which reduce the talents of others,”15 neither do the endowment advantaged, “have a right 
to a cooperative scheme that enables them to obtain further benefits in ways that do not 
contribute to the advantages of others.”16 So, interestingly, although Rawls concedes that 
the influence of endowment on distribution may be legitimate, Rawls denies outright that 
the notion of desert applies to his democratic conception. Given this complex stance, it is 
worth inquiring into the extent to which Rawls’s democratic equality transforms a 
meritocratic society and the principle of EO.  
 Rawls’s solution to the influence of talents and, specifically, to the greater 
advantages gained from their influence, is that endowment advantages ought to be 
considered a common asset to be used for the common advantage. Rawls’s general 
argument here is that, “[o]ne is not allowed to justify differences in income or in 
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positions of authority or responsibility on the ground that the disadvantages of those in 
one position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those in another.”17 In this 
general view, injustice is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all. The specific 
argument, stated here in its strongest form, from the point of view of citizens, is that it 
must be reasonable for each representative person to prefer their prospects with an 
inequality to their prospects without it.18  This specific notion of reciprocity, which 
ensures that inequalities among social positions work to benefit the worst-off, is one of 
the strongest requirements of Rawls’s egalitarianism: differences in natural assets are 
shown to be used for the common advantage when an inequality in the expectations of 
the worst-off satisfies an independent principle of justice, what Rawls labels the 
difference principle. According to this principle, social and economic inequalities are to 
be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society, or, in a weaker 
version of that principle, further inequalities must be shown not to make the 
representative worst-off group worse than they are presently.  
 The reason Rawls is led to the difference principle as a way of constraining the 
influence of arbitrary natural endowments, Kymlicka claims, is that Rawls defines the 
worst off in terms of primary goods. Primary goods, the total set of social benefits 
unconditionally regulated by institutions under Rawls's FEO, include an equal scheme of 
liberties such as freedom of thought and conscience, political liberties and association; 
fair background conditions of opportunity; the powers and prerogatives of positions of 
authority and responsibility; the social basis of self-respect; income and wealth. Primary 
goods are Rawls’s answer to the question of how inequalities are to be measured. Rawls’s 
argument for primary goods as a basis for interpersonal comparisons is, one, that 
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inequalities among citizens should be measured, “solely by reference to things which it is 
assumed they all need to carry out their plans.”19 Primary goods are justified publicly by 
their instrumental value to the interests of each individual. Two, if an objective list of 
social primary goods can be established, argues Rawls, we need only justify inequalities 
to a single representative group. That is, only inequalities in social primary goods need to 
be justified to the least advantaged, the position from which inequalities in the basic 
structure are to be judged.  
But primary goods and the difference principle satisfy the democratic demand for 
reciprocity. For Rawls, the reasons we have for allowing the influence of talents, and 
indeed the extent to which the difference principle transforms the aims of a meritocracy, 
depend a great deal on an account of how inequalities are to be measured, in what 
persons are to be deemed unequal. According to Philippe Van Parijs, however, a crucial 
misunderstanding of the difference principle is that some index of the worst-off’s actual 
advantages, such as actual income levels, should be maximized. As Van Parijs explains, 
the difference principle aims to maximize the lifetime opportunities and expectations of a 
representative group of persons, namely, the representative incumbents of the social 
position with the lowest such expectations. In Van Parijs’s words, “[t]he difference 
principle does not require us to equalize or maximin these outcomes [in wealth and 
resources] but only to maximize what the representative incumbent of the worst social 
position can expect, that is, the average lifetime index of social and economic advantages 
associated with a position accessible to all the least fortunate.”20 As Van Parijs makes 
clear, the difference principle is a principle of opportunity, which emphasizes advantages, 
“in terms of lifetime expectations of categories of people rather than in terms of particular 
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individual’s situations or goods at particular times.”21 As an egalitarian-opportunity 
principle concerned with expectations associated with social positions, the difference 
principle distinguishes democratic equality from a meritocracy in at least two ways: one, 
by avoiding comparisons of others on the basis of their actual wealth and income 
resources, as well as their levels of endowment, and two, by denying that one’s situation 
in the social system at any given time is necessarily a matter of justice. The aim of 
invoking the metric of primary goods is to provide a common perspective from which the 
distribution of opportunities and expectations produced by the social system can be 
assessed over the course of the lives of all persons.  
FEO and the difference principle, as well as primary goods, constitute what Rawls 
labels the ‘democratic’ interpretation of equality, which is to be contrasted with EO and 
its argument for simple efficiency. Like EO, Rawls agrees with a principle of efficiency, 
which states that, “[a]n arrangement of the basic structure is efficient when there is no 
way to change this distribution [of primary goods] so as to raise the prospects of some 
without lowering the prospects of others.”22 So Rawls allows that those with greater 
natural endowment ought to expect greater advantages on the whole, and that those with 
similar talents and skills and the willingness to use them should have roughly similar 
prospects regardless of their initial place in the social system. But it is crucial to Rawls’s 
view that because greater overall advantages, or moves to more efficient outcomes 
produced by these undeserved advantages, do not distinguish between fair outcomes, the 
principle of FEO takes priority over the difference principle. This priority ensures that, 
“the reasons for requiring open positions are not solely, or even primarily, those of 
efficiency [emphasis added].”23 In other words, efficiency gains arising from undeserved 
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endowment advantages are legitimate only after institutions secure a principle of non-
discrimination and open access to social and career positions. This priority rule ensures 
that the productivity and efficiency gains arising from the influence of talents preserves 
the integrity of individuals – their self-respect and confidence in their own worth, what 
Rawls argues is the most important primary good24 - and their place in the social system - 
the realization of self25 - while justifying the resulting inequalities in resources as 


















1.D. The Range of Arbitrariness 
 
 However, two major problems arise from Rawls’s concern with arbitrary, or 
undeserved advantages and disadvantages. The first, which is connected to the second, is 
how are we to understand Rawls’s reference to the ‘arbitrariness’ of undeserved social 
and natural circumstances? To what extent should institutions mitigate their influence? 
The second problem is: Just what are background conditions supposed to track?      
 Regarding the first, Rawls denies that, “the ordering of institutions is always 
defective because the distribution of natural talents and the contingencies of social 
circumstances are unjust [emphasis added].”26 Talents can be excepted from the range of 
undeserved factors influencing distributive outcomes provided that the added social 
productivity and individual benefits work to the advantage of the worst off. Richard 
Arneson argues, however, that the lexical priority Rawls gives to FEO over the difference 
principle is otiose at best. According to Arneson, the degree to which the difference 
principle allows for the influence of talents shows that the value of mitigating undeserved 
endowments is merely instrumental to, and indeed justifiable in the light of, greater 
overall social benefits. In fact, in the area of endowments that concerns Rawls, the 
normal range, “the two principles [FEO and the difference principle] do not conflict at 
all."27 According to Arneson, maximizing the worst off in terms of primary goods 
automatically rules out unfair discrimination that would disadvantage the worst off. More 
specifically, although the reasons we have for endorsing open positions may not be 
limited to arguments for efficiency, a concern for the worst off already mitigates harmful 
discrimination and the unfair influence of natural endowment on the distribution of social 
 18
primary goods. According to Arneson, then, in Rawls’s hands, the principle of FEO 
provides little guidance in identifying harmful effects of discrimination that a concern for 
the socioeconomic position of the worst-off would eliminate. A concern for the worst off 
does most of the work in transforming a meritocratic society and in removing harmful 
discrimination that would result from efficient outcomes. 
 Kymlicka’s criticism of Rawls’s FEO takes this ambiguity further. What are the 
background conditions of equality supposed to track? Recall part of Kymlicka’s 
characterization of FEO above (p.4, section 1.B.), “that it is fair for individuals to have 
unequal shares of social goods if those inequalities are earned and deserved by the 
individual, that is, if they are the product of the individual’s actions and choices 
[emphasis added].”28 Does Kymlicka think that inequalities must be earned or deserved, 
or is it that inequalities are fair if they are the result of choice? An argument against 
Rawls here, it seems, would have to focus on the extent to which Rawls can distinguish 
his democratic conception of equality from a meritocracy, or the extent to which his 
second principle of justice transforms efficient outcomes. In other words, we might focus 
on types of society or distinguish between distributive outcomes. But Kymlicka instead 
attributes to Rawls a distinct normative aim: “[o]ne of Rawls’s central intuitions… 
concerns the distinction between choices and circumstances [emphasis added].”29 Surely 
Kymlicka is right to ask what, precisely, institutions ought to track if the influence of 
arbitrary factors are to be mitigated. Throughout TJ, Rawls points to several features of 
the person relevant to distributive justice, including voluntary action, talent, effort and 
ambition. In particular, Rawls wants to rule out simple measures of welfare satisfaction, 
or preferences, as a measure of inequality. But is Kymlicka right to transform the 
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problem of distributive equality into a general problem of agency?  
  According to Kymlicka, “Rawls seems not to have realized the full implications 
of his own argument against the prevailing view of equality of opportunity.”30 
Kymlicka’s most convincing argument supporting the significance of choice derives from 
his claim that the difference principle makes sense only if we accept primary goods as the 
measure of inequality. For example, because the difference principle is applied 
subsequently to the influence of talents on distribution, “two people are equally well off 
for Rawls… if they have the same bundle of social primary goods, even though one 
persons may be untalented, physically handicapped, mentally disabled, or suffering from 
poor health.”31 However, as Kymlicka argues, a handicapped person with the same set of 
primary goods as the well endowed is not treated equally. The handicapped person is 
faced with extra costs, such as medical and transportation costs, as a result of arbitrary 
factors, an outcome allowed rather than removed by the difference principle. Because 
primary goods are not capable of measuring inequalities arising from individual 
differences in natural endowment, the difference principle and primary goods restrict the 
role individual choice plays in the pursuit of opportunity and advantage.  
 Whatever ambiguities lie in Rawls’s position, Kymlicka is wrong to say that 
Rawls is not aware of the problems of his democratic conception of equality. For one, as 
we have already seen, Rawls is concerned with persons of roughly similar natural 
endowment, that “those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life 
chances.”32 Second, despite his strongly stated concern with arbitrary factors, Rawls is 
very clear about the possibility of transforming the influence of endowment differences: 
“The effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and 
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the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to 
strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good 
fortune. The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable.”33 In fact, as Rawls states 
elsewhere, “[I]t is impossible in practice to secure equal chances … for those similarly 
endowed.”34 It is impossible to distinguish that part of a person’s situation resulting from 
talent and that part following from effort, choice or ambition which, in any case, as Rawls 
states, are themselves influenced arbitrarily by unequal social circumstances, such as the 
family. The centrality Kymlicka wants to attribute to the role of choice in Rawls’s FEO is 
misleading.  
 In my view, Rawls’s central aim is to distinguish his democratic conception of 
equality from the aims of a meritocracy and challenge the acceptability of starting-gate 
conceptions of EO by securing a range of outcomes that a strict concern with desert and 
efficiency would, respectively, otherwise allow. Primary goods in particular define the 
basis for interpersonal comparisons of inequality and the terms of reciprocity from a 
public point of view. The important point here is that although Rawls argues that primary 
goods are accepted as the measure of inequality by virtue of their instrumental good to all 
individuals as free and equal citizens, he does not rule out the influence of endowments 
or the arbitrary influence of social circumstances. In one sense, it can be argued that 
Rawls does not distinguish clearly enough the relevant features of persons, referring to 
preferences, voluntariness, ambition, effort, and a range of endowment differences such 
as capacities, talents and skills. As we have seen, Rawls is very aware of the practical 
limitations of distinguishing sharply between deserved and undeserved features of 
individuals as a way of determining fair shares. Nevertheless, it is clear that attributing to 
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Rawls a strict concern with the influence of choice misses the complexity of the problems 
to which Rawls does appear sensitive. Kymlicka’s arguments imply that there is a 
definitive feature of persons which just societies must track, namely, their choices. But 
wholehearted pursuit of a single feature of persons would surely result in a very particular 
kind of society. It follows from Rawls’s conception of equality that a range of democratic 
societies might legitimately meet the aims of his principles of justice. If we take Rawls’s 
concern with the distinction between, say, meritocratic and democratic societies, the 
crucial point is that we be able to distinguish a democratic society from societies that 
ascribe social positions and wealth solely on the basis of desert, the moral worth of 
persons, or by justification of natural authority, all of which lead unacceptably to the 
reproduction of social hierarchies and unjustified inequalities in wealth. Kymlicka’s 
mistaken emphasis on the radical implications of Rawls’s FEO dismisses the fact that 
Rawls's principles provide for a range of acceptable democratic types of societies. In fact, 
the aims Kymlicka attributes to Rawls conflict with the quite general aim of a democratic 
conception of equality, to mitigate the extent to which advantaged social positions and a 
greater share of distributive goods can be justified by reference to undeserved natural 
endowment and social circumstance.  
 We can now see why Arneson’s dismissal of the principle of FEO does not take 
seriously enough the reasons we have for upholding democratic norms of equality. A 
concern for the worst off may remove some harmful cases of discrimination. But judging 
between efficient outcomes solely on the basis of the well being of a single representative 
group ignores a common perspective or principle that applies equally to all.  
 But there is another aspect of Kymlicka’s concern with choice that is more 
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difficult to respond to: “Paying for choices is the flip side of our intuition about not 
paying for unequal circumstances.”35 Imagine two persons equally endowed and sharing 
the same social and family circumstances. Where one chooses a life of work and the other 
a life of leisure, the difference principle tells us to redistribute to the worst off. In this 
case, although the stated aim of the difference principle is to mitigate arbitrary 
circumstances, the difference principle unfairly penalizes the better-off by redistributing 
to the worse-off as a result of differences in choice: “Rather than removing a 
disadvantage, the difference principle simply makes her subsidize his expensive desire 
for leisure.”36 This is the problem of expensive tastes. In other words, just as the 
handicapped person’s opportunities to lead a life in line with her choices are reduced by 
the cost of endowment disadvantages, the difference principle does not distinguish among 
the beneficiaries of redistribution whose position can be attributed to choice. As 
Kymlicka argues, Rawls does not adequately hold individuals responsible for the costs of 











1.E. Primary Goods 
 
 The problem of choice and responsibility again concerns primary goods as the 
measure of inequality. In TJ, Rawls makes the argument that primary goods would be 
chosen by persons because they are what any rational person would require in order to 
pursue their opportunities and conceptions of the good; primary goods are instrumental to 
the lives of all persons. As I will argue below, like the significance of ‘arbitrariness’ and 
‘choice,’ we should be careful how we interpret that statement. At the very least, we 
should take seriously Rawls’s revision to that argument in PL, that primary goods are 
what persons need in their role and capacities as citizens to sustain fair terms of social 
cooperation. As I argue below, Rawls’s argument that primary goods are the appropriate 
measure of inequality is best understood in terms of a theory of fair shares, that is, by 
appeal to those goods required by persons as free and equal citizens and by appeal to the 
capacities of persons, for a sense of justice as well as rational advantage. This view is 
only partially worked out but nevertheless implicit in TJ’s account of primary goods.  
 As Rawls states in a later essay: 
As moral persons citizens have some part in forming and cultivating their final 
ends and preferences. It is not by itself an objection to the use of primary goods 
that it does not accommodate those with expensive tastes. One must argue in 
addition that it is unreasonable, if not unjust, to hold such persons responsible for 
their preferences and to require them to make out as best they can. But to argue 
this seems to presuppose that citizens’ preferences are beyond their control as 
propensities or cravings which simply happens… The use of primary goods… 
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relies on a capacity to assume responsibility for our ends.37
Is this, as Kymlicka thinks, an appeal to choice, ambition or autonomy? I do not believe it 
is, but Rawls's arguments in A Theory of Justice give us reason to think so. In this 
passage, however, Rawls clearly rules out any reference to choice based on simple 
preferences. But the difficulties Rawls confronts in distinguishing clearly between 
undeserved circumstances and features of the person relevant to distributive justice 
continue to elicit criticism. For one, according to Rawls, citizens have ‘some part’ in 
forming their ends. Rawls does not specify any single feature, such as choice, effort or 
talent, that institutions ought to track. Two, individuals have some part in forming their 
ends. Rawls does not specify which ends are relevant but, again, mentions several, 
including careers, conceptions of the good, self-interest, an interest in primary goods, 
plans of life. The ambiguity Kymlicka points out regarding choice and responsibility is 
explained as follows: Rawls holds persons responsible only to the extent that their actions 
and pursuit of their goals and ends affects the distribution of primary goods.  
 Kymlicka recognizes that in Rawls’s defense of primary goods there is an implicit 
argument about the instrumental value of choice. Primary goods provide the all-purpose 
means for persons to pursue their opportunities and ends. Ultimately, Kymlicka subsumes 
both the question of which features of the person are relevant to distributive justice and 
which ends are relevant under a single instrumental argument for the significance of 
autonomy. Choice is valuable for the pursuit of our ends and to the ability to revise those 
ends without coercion or penalty. But despite greater simplicity, this is not entirely 
helpful.  
 Rawls’s major claim about the significance of the basic structure was the 
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profound and pervasive influence of institutions on the expectations and outcomes of 
individuals. Institutions play a great role in determining which aspects of the person are 
favored over other aspects, and the range of ends that individuals have the opportunity to 
pursue. Where FEO addresses the common reasons we have for regulating the ways in 
which natural and social circumstance may be used to regulate access to social positions 
and distributive shares, the difference principle addresses the range of acceptable 
inequalities. In other words, we need a common, or public measure of inequality 
precisely because social positions and distributive shares are so closely linked to natural 
and social circumstance that can be used to justify and uphold those advantages. A 
strictly instrumental concern with autonomy simply avoids the difficulty of determining a 
public point of view from which inequalities in the ability to pursue available 
opportunities may be judged. Primary goods define the range of goods individuals are 
entitled to as citizens and responsibility is an issue because primary goods are the product 
of social cooperation. Fair terms of social cooperation and just institutions, however, 
demand of individuals that the pursuit of their rational advantage does not diminish a fair 
share of primary goods for all.  
 G.A. Cohen points to a difficulty with Rawls’s position: “it is not easy to 
reconcile what Rawls says about effort with what he says about tastes.”38 Rawls denies 
that it is possible to distinguish the extent to which talents influence distribution, yet 
wants to mitigate their influence. At the same time, Rawls avoids the question of whether 
preferences are within the full control of individuals, yet deems persons fully responsible 
for their preferences, tastes and ends. In order to make sense of Rawls’s claims about 
responsibility for preferences, Cohen appeals to Scanlon’s interpretation of Rawls‘s 
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understanding of agency: we do not have immediate control over our preferences, but we 
do have some control over their formation over time,39 and this capacity is part of what it 
means to choose our ends or plans of life. This helps to make sense of why it is accurate 
to say with Rawls that citizens have some part in determining their ends and preferences 
despite the fact that institutions are bound to favor some aspects of persons and range of 
ends at any given time. Neither the principles of justice regulating institutions nor the 
institutions themselves can adequately determine or sustain fair outcomes over time. 
Individuals must bear some responsibility for their rational interest in social goods 
because the terms of social cooperation are linked to the capacities of persons. 
 Rawls’s reference to the fact that agents not only can but ought to revise and 
adjust their ends is crucial to how Rawls views the link of primary goods to 
responsibility. Primary goods underline a commitment by citizens to take responsibility 
in their public role as free and equal citizens, over the course of their lives, that the 
pursuit of their self-interest does not undermine a fair distribution of those goods that all 
persons need as citizens, namely, the primary goods. As goods persons require in their 
capacity to adhere to fair terms of social cooperation, social primary goods define those 
things that individuals understand and openly acknowledge is at stake in maintaining fair 
as well as efficient terms of social cooperation and mutual benefit. In other words, 
because social primary goods are the products of a cooperative political community, it 
cannot be expected of citizens to adhere to fair terms of social cooperation absent a fair 
share of those goods.  
 Kymlicka’s argument was that the difference principle unfairly burdens the better 
off by redistributing to the worse-off whose position can be attributed to choice. But this 
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follows only if we take the concern with mitigating arbitrary factors as absolute and as 
applying to specific individual cases. The determinacy demanded by Kymlicka seems 
better suited to the implementation of specific redistributive policies. The main 
conclusion to be drawn from Rawls here is that institutions cannot plausibly track 
responsibility at the individual level. The problem is that institutions cannot plausibly 
track individual choice: it is impracticable and indeed undesirable to attempt to unravel 
the reciprocal influence of the range of undeserved advantages and disadvantages to the 
degree suggested by Kymlicka’s examples, especially among the least-advantaged. 
 Cohen’s concern is similarly addressed. The reason Rawls is willing to assign 
responsibility for tastes and preferences is that individuals have a great deal more control 
over the formation of their interests and preferences over time than they do the 
distribution of endowments. That is why Rawls can attribute a degree of responsibility to 
institutions for regulating the influence of endowment on distributive shares and to 
individuals for the formation of expectations and shares of primary goods. Indeed, the 
idea of using the greater endowment advantages of some for the common advantage 
emphasizes, “the productive roles that people occupy, in recognition of the fact that 
society attaches economic benefits to performance in a role rather than to the possession 
of talent in itself.”40 The concern with greater determinacy is unwarranted and does not 
stand as a weakness of Rawls’s conception of equality. Again, institutions and the 
division of labor favor some starting points over others and that is why Rawls avoids 
characterizing a single ideal type of society. There is bound to be indeterminacy in 
fulfilling the principles of justice, a range of democratic societies whose institutional 
structure and terms of cooperation characterizing those institutions fall acceptably within 
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Rawls's principles of justice.  
 






















2.A. Dworkin’s Auction 
 
 The criticisms leveled against Rawls thus far are derived from what, following 
Elizabeth Anderson, has become known as ‘luck egalitarianism’. Ronald Dworkin’s 
version of luck egalitarianism, ‘equality of resources,’ is regarded as the first theory to 
significantly advance the claim, attributed to Rawls, that institutions should work 
principally to eliminate endowment disadvantages so that a person’s life chances depend 
solely on ambition, or choice. Dworkin’s call for an ambition-sensitive and endowment-
insensitive distribution differs most significantly from Rawls’s FEO and difference 
principle in that Dworkin rejects equality of outcomes secured by the difference principle 
and any principle securing equal outcomes. This does not mean equality of resources is 
not concerned with outcomes, however. For Dworkin, unequal individual outcomes are 
legitimate if they arise from conditions that track as closely as possible the cost to others 
of the pursuit of individual ambition. Dworkin articulates his normative aim with two 
mechanisms: the competitive, or free marketplace and insurance markets. We have seen 
the kind of difficulties Rawls’s FEO, and any theory that seeks to interpret what it means 
to mitigate arbitrary or undeserved circumstances, must confront. The purpose here is to 
investigate further the possibility of a theory of fair shares and, specifically, the extent to 
which institutions can track responsibility.  
 Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism focuses on the strengths of a competitive 
market. As he notes, however, throughout its history, free markets have been associated 
with everything from individual liberty, the promotion of community-wide goals, such as 
prosperity, efficiency, and utility, and have even been proclaimed an enemy of equality. 
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Dworkin’s idea of an ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive distribution aims to 
provide a different interpretation of the market that tracks the equal concern of 
individuals, and is distinguishable from what Dworkin calls a simple ‘economy of 
consumption.’  
 Dworkin presents his argument in a familiar way, from an initially equal position 
of equality from which point inequalities are to be judged. But Dworkin aims to sharpen 
Rawls’s cut between deserved and undeserved inequalities. For Dworkin, there are two 
kinds of resources of concern for a theory of distributive justice between which Rawls 
does not distinguish sharply enough. First, resources may refer to differential internal 
features of a person, their talents and ambitions. The problem for Dworkin, as it is for 
Rawls, is that physical and mental powers are resources whose distribution is not within 
the control of social institutions. Significantly, Dworkin’s equality of resources focuses 
solely on mitigating arbitrary differences in endowment, citing two main kinds, talents 
and handicaps; social circumstances are not mentioned in the essay. Secondly, there are 
external resources, such as valuable career positions and material goods and wealth. 
These resources are scarce and are in general gained competitively, and that is why 
individuals ought to compete for external resources only on the basis of their morally 
relevant internal resources. The challenge, according to Dworkin, is to link the 
distribution of scarce external resources to an individual’s ambitions while eliminating 
the influence of morally irrelevant internal resources, such as talents, which should not 
affect an individual’s fair share. For Dworkin, if we are to maximize the conditions under 
which we can attribute to individuals responsibility for their circumstances and share of 
external resources, inequalities are properly legitimated by an ambition-sensitive and 
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endowment-insensitive distribution of external resources. Another way of stating the aim 
is that the state is to provide background conditions in which such judgments are made 
possible. For Dworkin, this is the central aim of an egalitarian political philosophy. 
 Dworkin’s auction begins by asking us to imagine a hypothetical situation in 
which an ‘executor’ distributes to each individual equal spending resources enabling 
persons to bid for a fixed stock of desired scarce (external) goods, which have been 
divided up into roughly equal bundles. From here, individuals are given the opportunity 
to compete with others for their preferred set of goods. If each individual spends their 
resources on the bundle of goods that they prefer most, eventually, through a competitive 
bidding process, all goods should clear markets, that is, all the goods will be bought and 
acquired at precisely the price each individual is willing to spend. Although the auction 
clearly results in an unequal distribution of goods in the sense that no individual may get 
the precise set of goods they desire, the outcome is fair to the extent that no one envies 
any other person’s goods.  
 One way Dworkin distinguishes his resource egalitarianism from EO is the 
standard for an equal distribution, the envy test, which says that a distribution is fair and 
equal when no one prefers another’s bundle of goods. To be sure, the envy test does not 
require that persons do not envy another’s resources at any particular time; that is 
inevitable and in any case impossible to fulfill. Put this way, the envy test distinguishes 
Dworkin’s auction from a simple economy of consumption in which inequalities in 
external resources are not ruled out as a reason for envy. Like Rawls, Dworkin sees 
resources as instrumental to the lives of individuals. The important point is that 
Dworkin’s auction is not primarily concerned with the distribution of goods, but the 
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impact of that distribution on and over the lives of individuals. The envy test requires that 
no one prefers another’s life and total resources held over the course of another’s life. 
More importantly, then, Dworkin argues against starting-gate conceptions of the market 
that it is simply arbitrary to equalize resources at one point in time but not another, and in 
any case begs the question of why it was required in the first place. An envy free 
distribution of resources invokes the equal good of each individual’s life plans in 
accordance with the resources required to lead that plan.  
 According to the auction, since each person had an equal opportunity to bid for 
their desired bundle of goods, could have bid more for goods not obtained and indeed, 
could have bid for another bundle of goods, the competitive bidding process is able to 
track closely the ambitions of individuals, what they are willing to spend on a particular 
bundle of scarce goods. As Kymlicka puts it, “people are treated with equal 
consideration, for differences between them simply reflect their different ambitions.”41 
According to Dworkin, the auction generates a distribution more consistent with Rawls’s 
notion of social equality, or fair shares. An unequal distribution generates legitimate 
inequalities when individuals are held responsible for their share of scarce external 
resources. 
 The notion of responsibility supporting the envy test can be spelled out more 
clearly. The distributive problem Dworkin wants to solve is that, “it is not an equal 
division of social resources when someone who consumes more of what others want 
nevertheless has as much initial resources left over as those who consume less.”42 One 
appealing aspect of Dworkin’s auction is the common sense notion that individuals ought 
to pay for the costs of their ambitions, or life plans. For Dworkin, the idea of ‘opportunity 
 33
costs’ is used specifically as a way to confer responsibility on individuals for their share 
of scarce resources, and the costs of the life they choose to lead with those resources. The 
mechanism of the auction illustrates how the pursuit of one’s preferences imposes costs 
on others and potentially limits the range of goods and options available to others: the 
greater the demand for a bundle of goods, the higher the cost. Put another way, markets 
set, “the value of any transferable resource one person has as the value others forgo by 
his having it,”43 what could be characterized as a process of elimination through 
possessive ambition. Much has been made of the idea that Dworkin views his articulation 
of the auction as an improvement on the sense Rawls gives to the idea of fair shares. 
Dworkin’s claim is that his auction enforces what primary goods cannot do without the 
difference principle, namely, force the individual, “to take responsibility for the true costs 
of his own choices.”44  
 Many view Dworkin’s auction as an appeal to what is today the status quo, the 
acceptability of a highly commercial society, and specifically, that market value is the 
primary measure of value. Heath argues that the normative aims Dworkin attributes to his 
auction are in fact confused. As Heath explains, Dworkin’s auction consists of two 
distinct distributions; the executor’s initially equal distribution and the final, envy-free 
distribution resulting from persons themselves. According to Heath, however, the 
auction, “does not serve to create equality, since the initial allocation is already perfectly 
equal and envy-free.”45 In other words, if an unequal but legitimate distribution is one in 
which there are no complaints for reasons of fairness, the executor’s initial distribution of 
spending resources already solves the major problem stated by Dworkin. Indeed, simply 
by virtue of the executor‘s equal distribution of resources, there is no basis for the claim 
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that anyone has been treated unequally. In fact, beyond this initial distribution, “any 
equality of bidding power must be a function of the equality of the initial distribution.”46 
Put another way, the auction does not make the resulting distribution ‘more equal’; the 
auction is neither more nor less equal than it was from the situation of initially equal 
resources. Rather, “[t]he problem with the initial allocation is simply that it is 
inefficient.”47 As such, argues Heath, market transactions in Dworkin’s equality of 
resources do not serve the value of equality at all, but serve, rather, the value of 
efficiency, and indeed, this is precisely the aim of a perfectly competitive market in the 
real world. Dworkin simply substitutes the goal of a perfectly competitive market with 
the value of equality.  
 Dworkin claims that, “the idea of an economic market, as a device for setting 
prices for a vast variety of goods and services, must be at the center of any attractive 
theoretical development of equality of resources.”48 As Heath points out, the social value 
of competitive markets is well-established, and the claim that markets necessarily tend 
either to equality or inequality is in general mysterious if not suspicious. Dworkin at one 
point even argues that under equality of resources, ‘efficiency is fairness.’49 According to 
Heath, this is deeply misguided. The assumptions underlying Dworkin’s auction are well-
settled among economists and do not support the egalitarianism Dworkin attributes to the 
idealizations of a perfectly functioning market. Moreover, the fact that the auction - a 
perfectly competitive market - does achieve a high level of efficiency is a relatively 
trivial implication: the idealizing assumptions enable precisely this result. Once we see 
this, it is hard to appreciate how Dworkin’s auction contributes to equality.  
 Heath is right to question the extent to which a free market can attend to equality. 
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But I think it is false to view Dworkin as merely advocating a simple view of the free 
market. In any case, I do not think Dworkin’s insights are limited to arguments for the 
value of competitive markets. As Dworkin makes clear in his essay ‘Equality of 
Resources’ it is truly an intellectual curiosity, and perhaps bizarre, that the accumulation 
of wealth should become the mark of a successful life and that persons who have 
arranged their lives in pursuit of wealth should be the proper object of envy within 
societies having the level of wealth and prosperity currently enjoyed, except where that 
wealth is so unevenly distributed. As Dworkin goes on to say: 
We are so ignorant of the complex genealogy of the implausible attitudes about 
wealth that we find among us, which those who point to the moral costs of the 
market system deplore, that we would do wrong to assume in advance that these 
same attitudes will arise in a market system whose very point is to encourage the 
kind of reflective examination about costs and gains under which these attitudes 
would seem most likely to shrivel and disappear.50     
This thought-provoking statement places a great onus on Dworkin to distinguish his view 
of the market. I want to suggest two ways in which Dworkin’s auction may be developed 
further.  
 Recall two ways Dworkin distinguishes his auction. First, the envy test applies 
simply to resources, or levels of wealth, over the course of the life of individuals. That is, 
Dworkin denies that one’s resource levels at any given time are necessarily significant as 
a matter of equality. This is a complex standard for a claim of justice, for it undermines 
defenders of unregulated market inequalities as well as those who would wish to claim 
redistributive benefits on the basis of immediate resource inequalities. But a more 
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expansive reading of the envy test might apply the aims of that test, its application over 
the lives of individuals, to claims other than resources which would, in turn, alter what 
that test is to measure. Heath’s reading, while pointing out the obvious flaws in 
Dworkin’s account of the auction, does not even attempt to tease out its uses and 
applications. Heath does not even tell what other ideal theories Dworkin’s auction might 
be contrasted with in order to convey its limitations. That is, despite its internal problems, 
it may in fact be better than the alternatives. Second, Dworkin’s notion of ‘opportunity 
costs’ demonstrates clearly that even if the free market is not central to the pursuit of 
equality, the ideal conditions of the auction simply put in the starkest of terms how claims 
of justice create costs and burdens within a system of social cooperation. Along with the 
claim to a fair share of primary goods, the opportunity costs of their provision is a 
defining feature of a theory of fair shares and of political life generally. Moreover, this 
tension is clearly not necessarily limited to market transactions or to simple claims to 
resources. There are many other areas relevant to equality to which the concept might 
apply, such as the provision of goods that are either inefficiently or inappropriately 
distributed by market competition such as Rawls’s primary goods. 
 However, the ability of Dworkin’s auction to track fully an ambition-sensitive and 
endowment-insensitive distribution rests largely on the adjustments Dworkin makes to 
the market. Specifically, an endowment-insensitive distribution, Dworkin admits, is not 





2.B. The Insurance Market 
 
 Notice that the auction by itself does not remove the influence of talents or the 
extra cost to persons of handicaps. One problem is that the envy test rules out the 
legitimacy of gains from talents at the auction, yet those with greater natural talent or 
skills can be expected to either earn more or to be more productive over time. In other 
words, the auction fails the envy test because those less fortunately endowed will envy 
the lives of those whose talents unfairly reaped greater opportunities and resources. 
According to the envy test, we need to know how much extra resources are a result of 
undeserved talents. But just as Rawls was, we are thwarted by the reciprocal relation 
between talents and ambition and as such, “Rawls’s refusal to compensate for natural 
disadvantages makes sense.”51 The link between talent and resources is simply too close 
to allow such fine-grained assessments of individuals. Because the development of talent 
over time is partly determined by ambition, effort and social circumstance, it is both 
implausible and infeasible to track that part of a person’s extra resources attributable to 
natural, rather than chosen skills and talents.  
 A second problem is the effect of endowment disadvantages on an initially equal 
distribution. If we imagine what the severely handicapped will have to spend on 
expensive medical costs in order to compete effectively in the market, the amount of 
redistribution required to reach an initially equal starting point could result in an 
inordinate amount of resources being transferred from the talented to the handicapped. 
 One solution is to pay the costs required for the untalented and handicapped to 
compete at an equal starting point before the auction and then divide the remaining 
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spending resources. Dworkin dismisses this option, arguing that while some 
disadvantages can be appropriately compensated, “that goal is impossible to achieve in 
other cases, for no amount of social goods will fully compensate for certain natural 
disadvantages.”52 No amount of money can equalize the effects of all inequalities in 
natural endowment, and indeed, eliminating differences in natural endowment in a world 
of finite spending resources, even if possible, would leave very little resources to track in 
any meaningful sense the ambitions of individuals. This is in itself, claims Dworkin, a 
source of unfairness. In any case, argues Dworkin, “The problem is, rather, one of 
determining how far the ownership of independent material resources should be affected 
by differences that exist in physical and mental powers.”53 We must avoid conflating the 
equalizing of endowment with equalizing differences in wealth and income gained from 
those differences, which is the proper aim of a theory of distributive equality.  
 Dworkin concedes the problem handicaps pose to his theory: if the role of the 
state is to mitigate the influence of endowment disadvantages on distribution, we must 
find a way to counteract the unfair internal disadvantages of some while leaving enough 
spending resources to track the ambitions of all. If we pay for the full costs of equalizing 
endowments, there will be little left with which to run the auction and hence, track 
ambition. If we do not redistribute enough, the endowment-disadvantaged will be unable 
to compete fairly at the auction and increasingly over the course of their lives. Although 
Dworkin proposes two separate hypothetical insurance markets for talents and handicaps, 
I will discuss them together since, in any case, Dworkin proposes the possibility that the 
two be merged. 
 The insurance scheme is intended to set a level of redistribution that resolves the 
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conflict between ambitions and endowments, and in a way that tracks opportunity cost, as 
does the auction. The idea is to imagine that prior to the auction, no one knows their 
place in the distribution of endowments. After the total finite spending resources are 
divided equally among all, an insurance market is set up that gives individuals the option 
to purchase insurance. The insurance scheme might operate at the hypothetical level by 
posing the following question to individuals: What, out of your initially equal stock of 
resources, would you spend to insure against the odds that you will end up with more 
rather than less natural disadvantage? Dworkin recognizes that in practice the response is 
likely to be settled by a few public officials. But if we can imagine what each individual 
would likely spend, we can arrive at an aggregative figure that, though will not 
compensate fully, like the auction, compensates fairly in the sense that at the hypothetical 
level, the insurance scheme pays out for endowment disadvantages that individuals chose 
to insure against. Even this degree of sensitivity to individual circumstance is, however, 
unnecessary. As Dworkin points out, like insurance markets in the real world, levels of 
compensation need only be set according to categories of risk against which people 
would insure in a general way.54
 The problem with the insurance scheme is that it alters Dworkin’s initial concern 
with opportunity costs in the auction. Where the auction tracks the costs of pursuing 
one’s preferences at the cost to others, the insurance scheme tracks willingness for risk. 
The initial problem with the auction is its inability to mitigate the effects of brute luck: 
“Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not… deliberate gambles,”55 such as 
the effects of endowment on distribution. But the insurance scheme invokes a different 
type of luck, option luck: “Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated 
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gambles turn out - whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he 
or she could have anticipated and might have declined.”56 The purpose of the insurance 
market is to provide persons the option to insure against brute luck circumstances that 
detract from one’s fair share of external resources with which to pursue chosen life plans. 
That is, the insurance market is meant to arrive at a rough measure of the resources 
persons would be willing to spend or, more accurately, risk on insuring against categories 
of brute luck endowment disadvantages. According to Dworkin, the insurance market 
mitigates endowment disadvantages in a way consistent with ambition sensitivity. We 
mitigate unfair gains and costs resulting from endowment by redistributing from those 
with good option luck to those with bad brute luck.  
 But this quite different kind of ambition introduces a different way of tracking 
cost, what we may call ‘opportunity risk.’ The ‘opportunity’ is simply the option to 
protect against losses resulting from unforeseen circumstances and in particular, 
endowment disadvantages. The ‘risk’ results from the hypothetical supposition that prior 
to the auction, no one knows how much or how little natural advantage they will end up 
with. The rationality of opportunity risk is more complex than opportunity cost in the 
auction because, as Dworkin remarks, standard insurance markets are rarely good 
gambles. This detracts from Dworkin’s claim that the insurance market is sensitive to 
ambition, however, for the insurance market forces upon persons, not so much a choice, 
but a very delicate and information-dependent risk assessment. Individuals are forced to 
weigh the costs of giving up initial spending resources, the means for pursuing ambitions 
competitively in the auction, for a redistributive benefit package that is sensitive to the 
level of disadvantage a person ends up with, but which may not fully compensate for the 
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amount of initial resources spent no matter how bad the disadvantage turns out to be. 
Specifically, the risk against expected losses resulting from a purchase in the insurance 
market make sense, “only when it protects, not just against having less wealth than one 
otherwise might, but against being in such a significantly worse position that it is worth a 
technically bad investment to avoid any chance of it.”57 As Dworkin makes clear again, 
the insurance market makes clear the stakes of pitting scarcity against fair opportunity for 
gain. For those whose choose not to gamble at all, “the price of a safer life,… is precisely 
forgoing any chance of the gains whose prospect induces others to gamble.”58 
 Although it is clear enough that persons will be inclined to risk as little as possible 
against brute luck, Dworkin argues that it would be imprudent for any individual not to 
insure at all. This is significant. Despite the concern with individual responsibility, 
Dworkin denies that his theory provides only a minimal role for the state. The very 
rationality of the insurance market ensures that each person receive some level of 
guaranteed coverage against endowment disadvantages arising from brute luck. 
Nevertheless, the plausibility of the insurance market depends on the equal option of each 
to take a similar risk, for only then is the distribution resulting from differential option 








 3.A. Anderson and Democratic Equality 
 
 Elizabeth Anderson provides one of the most incisive criticisms of the position 
defended in various forms by Dworkin, Kymlicka and Cohen, what Anderson labels ‘luck 
egalitarianism.’ Anderson rejects the claim that those who refuse an available and 
reasonable insurance gamble no longer have claims on others. As Anderson argues, those 
who suffer bad option luck under Dworkin’s scheme are potentially thrown into the very 
forms of destitution and exploitation that democratic struggles for equality historically 
have sought to eliminate. In Anderson’s view, a society that abandons its citizens through 
reasonable choice does not treat persons as equals. In Anderson’s words, “the reasons 
luck egalitarians offer for refusing to come to the aid of the victims of bad option luck 
express a failure to treat these unfortunates with equal respect and concern.”59 There is a 
clear rationality to the insurance market, which many authors have criticized. But a 
central reason luck egalitarians have focused on Rawls’s second principle of justice and, 
specifically, his theory of fair shares, is to improve upon the role of responsibility in a 
theory of distributive equality. As Kymlicka states, “equality teaches us how much by 
way of resources we have to pursue our projects, and how much is rightfully left for 
others.”60 According to Cohen, however, although Dworkin’s equality of resources 
appeals to ambition in a way that Rawls rejects, in fact, “[c]hoice is in the background, 
doing a good deal of unacknowledged work.”61 Anderson’s article is particularly 
important for drawing out the political and social implications of luck egalitarianism in 
its various forms. When Anderson asks: What is the point of equality?, she is not merely 
concerned with distributive rationality, but with the reasons we have for supporting an 
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egalitarian politics. 
 From a general perspective, the aims of luck egalitarians seem distinctly eminent: 
“[o]nly when everyone faces a sufficient range of acceptable options can we say that 
individuals can live their lives in accordance with their voluntary choices,… and claim 
that individuals may justifiably be held responsible for the outcomes of their actions.”62 A 
closer look reveals that, as an accurate account of egalitarian politics, the rationality of 
that view is limited and flawed. The fundamental condition by which the insurance 
scheme can legitimate resource inequalities resulting from endowment differences is the 
equal opportunity to run a similar risk. But it remains unclear to what degree option luck, 
or opportunity risk, tracks individual ambition. In fact, the insurance scheme leads 
predictably to a narrow range of reasonably rational choices: “[t]he only lotteries that one 
would like to retain in the opportunity sets, because they are clear cases of option luck, 
are bad lotteries, those that nobody should take.”63 The obviously rational gambles 
provided by the insurance market would involve clear cases of brute luck, such as severe 
and costly disabilities. Risk sets involving, say, a lack of talent, would appeal only to risk 
takers whose bad luck transforms unreasonably costly risks into noncompensable cases of 
option luck. According to Fleurbaey, then, option luck entails a paradox: “the more it 
conveys responsibility, the less valuable it is for opportunity sets.”64 According to 
Anderson, however, opportunity risk cannot transform brute into option luck no matter 
how rational the gamble. In a case, “[b]etween two people who responsibly assume the 
same risk, where one person won and the other lost, the only difference is one of brute 
luck.”65 In other words, the insurance scheme cannot eliminate the incidence of brute 
luck simply by offering an opportunity to insure against the odds of suffering a particular 
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effect. Those who suffer bad option luck are still in fact victims of brute luck.    
 Given these difficulties with the rationality of the insurance scheme, Dworkin’s 
general strategy might be seen to beg the question. If the point of the insurance scheme is 
to provide a roughly equal opportunity to take a similar risk, through categories of risk, 
then correcting the overall distribution of wealth is arguably prior to asking whether 
individuals can afford to purchase an adequate level of coverage or what individuals 
would purchase. To what extent is this tension a liability to Dworkin’s theory of equality? 
It is clear that Dworkin’s insurance scheme cannot maintain the normative aims he sets 
out for that scheme. I want to draw on some policy examples provided by Dworkin to 
illustrate that although the results of the hypothetical insurance scheme are roughly 
predictable and the conditions for an equal opportunity to insure largely a product of 
institutional regulation rather than choice, the insurance scheme does make clear the 
consequences of taking seriously the opportunity costs of providing scarce goods. 
 Anderson wants to press the question of whether the rationality of the insurance 
scheme is an example of responsible social planning or abandonment of the least 
advantaged. As Dworkin states in the case of welfare reform, a theory in which 
opportunity costs are central will want to avoid two evils: “a welfare program so porous 
that it allow extensive abuse and one so stringent that it denies welfare to many people 
who need and deserve it.”66 As is clear, however, this is far from tracking the ambitions 
of individuals. In the area of social policy that concerns Dworkin, the insurance scheme 
leads predictably to a middle position. The rationality of opportunity costs can in practice 
rule out only the most extreme positions and this undermines Dworkin’s stated aim of 
tracking individual ambition.   
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 But Dworkin’s approach is not without further theoretical resources. As Dworkin 
points out, it is not an argument to say that we spend too little or too much on a particular 
social program since that presupposes that we know how much we should spend. On the 
one hand, then, is the conservative position that persons should be left with the coverage 
that they can afford. On the other hand, Dworkin refers to popular views supporting 
health care programs, such as the rescue principle, the view that each human life is 
valuable no matter the cost. According to Dworkin, state-funded provision under the 
rescue principle provides more than what people would spend if they had to pay the full 
costs themselves. We cannot provide all with the medical care that the richest can buy, 
but nor can we avoid the question of justice: “what is ‘appropriate’ medical care depends 
on what it would be unfair to withhold on the grounds that it costs too much.”67 In one of 
his most pointed statements about the consequences of adopting the opportunity costs 
imposed by the hypothetical insurance market, Dworkin asks whether people would 
change their view of the rescue principle and the level of spending appropriate for a 
health care program if it were known that the majority of health care dollars were spent in 
the last six months of life. In Dworkin’s view, most of us would agree not to spend a 
greater amount of our overall resources over the course of our healthy lives in order to 
prolong an extremely expensive six months. This kind of difficult questioning is, I think, 
extremely valuable. It avoids the conservative position that persons ought simply to 
receive coverage for which they can pay, but forces even advocates of universal coverage 
to consider the costs of provision. Dworkin’s approach demonstrates that we do not 
necessarily need to correct the overall distribution of wealth prior to the fair provision of 
a social good under conditions of scarcity. This is, in my view, a major contribution to 
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egalitarian theory. In my view, then, Dworkin does address the reasons we have for 
treating persons as equals, and these reasons are generated by applying the notion of 
opportunity costs to the provision of social goods. 
 Anderson’s second main criticism posits a strong separation between the aims of a 
theory that is concerned with choice and luck, and one that is properly concerned with 
institutions. Anderson argues that because Dworkin’s theory guarantees equality only ex 
ante, that is, hypothetically, “before one has made any adult choices,”68 the rationality of 
option luck conflicts with equality. For example, “people who have an extremely rare but 
severe disability could be ineligible for special aid just because the chances of anyone 
suffering it were so minute that it was ex ante rational for people not to purchase 
insurance against it.”69 The rationality of the insurance scheme, and the available options, 
determine to a great extent the ambitions of reasonable and responsible persons. 
Moreover, the hypothetical conditions do much of the work of transforming preferences 
into responsible choice. For example, the insurance scheme entitles a risk-averse blind 
person to aid that a risk-loving blind person would be denied, simply because the latter 
probably would not have insured against being blind, given the probabilities.70 Here, the 
same handicap is treated different on the basis of individual characteristics rather than the 
social or financial costs of that disadvantage. The insurance scheme cannot solve the 
problem of determining when endowment differences are so bad as to require 
compensation.   
 Anderson spells out the problem quite precisely: “In focusing on correcting the 
supposed injustices of nature, luck egalitarians have forgotten that the primary subject of 
justice is the institutional arrangements that generate people’s opportunities over time.”71 
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There are two ways to read Anderson here. On the one hand, Anderson argues that 
equality just is about social relationships and the institutions that regulate the life chances 
of people, and this has nothing to do with regulating the effects of fortune and chance. 
Anderson argues that, in fact, the distribution of natural endowments is neither just nor 
unjust; how institutions deal with those differences can be judged just or unjust. 
Interestingly, this is consistent with Rawls argument for FEO in TJ, that, “[t]he natural 
distribution is neither just not unjust; nor is it unjust that men are born into society at 
some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the 
way that institutions deal with these facts.”72 Would Anderson, and Rawls, then argue 
that their institutional view of equality would necessarily prevent the consequences of 
Dworkin’s approach so well teased out in Anderson’s examples? In my view, Anderson 
shows convincingly that the concerns of luck egalitarians are misplaced: inordinate 
weight is given to the causes of outcomes over the question of the kinds of goods that are 
to count as primary. This is a major distinction between the two approaches affecting the 
way institutions regulate the distribution of goods, resources and opportunities. But 
although the reasons for compensation diverge, I think it could be shown that in the area 
of redistributive social policy the institutional approach could not further improve upon 
the socioeconomic circumstances of the endowment disadvantaged.  
 But there is a different way to approach the distinction Anderson draws between 
institutional and luck egalitarianism. Where for luck egalitarians, “[s]ocial relationships 
are largely seen as instrumental to generating… patterns of distribution,”73 Anderson 
argues that distributive patterns governing the distribution of external resources are one 
aspect of the total institutional arrangements that fall within the purview of equality, 
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including fixed and mutable traits, divisible resources, social relations and norms, the 
structure of opportunities, public goods, and public spaces.74 I think this second 
interpretation is the better one. In other words, egalitarians do not need to determine 
whether the natural distribution of endowment is inherently just or unjust. The question 
remains which approach provides better reasons for compensating the disadvantaged. 
Where the institutional approach is more appropriate to determining the social costs to 
individuals of their disadvantages, Dworkin’s approach is better suited to determining 

















 3.B. Defending ‘Opportunity Costs’ 
  
 In order to illustrate this contrast further, I want to draw out responses to three of 
Anderson’s criticisms. First, Anderson criticizes the kind of judgements made by luck 
egalitarians that determine compensation. According to Anderson, those who truly lack 
talent or who are severely handicapped must, under luck egalitarian standards, 
demonstrate publicly their inherent inferiority in order that the costs of their disadvantage 
are equalized. I reject Anderson’s strong claim that a concern with distributive patterns 
necessarily creates social relations that treat individuals instrumentally. In fact, because 
the community that adopts the insurance strategy of equality treats the counterfactual 
questions as statistical and impersonal, Dworkin has some basis for the claim that his 
theory removes the influence of hierarchical social relations. Dworkin specifically 
mentions how the formulations arrived at by way of hypothetical determinations remove 
the opportunities for insurance adjusters and governments to unfairly deny policy 
coverage or discriminate against those who, say, are believed or can be shown to be 
endowment disadvantaged or genetically predisposed to an illness. The real problem is 
that even minimum coverage, however provided, will be unfairly unavailable to many of 
the worst–off. As Dworkin argues, a universal program that weighs the actual costs of 
disadvantages will unfairly burden the choices of others. In any case, it is impossible to 
equalize the social or financial costs of endowment disadvantages among the worst-off.  
Second, does equality of resources necessarily violate the equal treatment of 
persons by allowing those who suffer bad option luck to fall into destitution or 
exploitation? I think Dworkin has a case against this charge. As Dworkin makes very 
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clear in Sovereign Virtue, even if unfair social circumstances such as class and prejudice 
could be eliminated, it would still be true that some persons would be endowment 
disadvantaged through no fault of their own. The argument that the worst-off who suffer 
bad option luck are not treated as equals is no argument against a cost-effective policy. 
As I argued, this is really a criticism that the existing distribution of wealth is unfair. 
Dworkin states this quite clearly: “a just distribution is one that well-informed people 
create for themselves by individual choices, provided that the economic system and the 
distribution of wealth in the community in which these choices are made are themselves 
just.”75 Anderson might charge that Dworkin’s theory applies only if wealth and power 
were distributed equally. To the extent it is not now, the hypothetical aspects of 
Dworkin’s theory do a lot of the normative work. But as we saw above, the hypothetical 
aspects of Dworkin’s approach to social policy effectively eliminate unacceptable 
options, the conservative’s ‘pay what you can afford’, and implausible and possibly 
irrational attitudes like the rescue principle. This might lead to a policy option in which 
the worst-off will predictably suffer the social and financial costs of their disadvantages. 
But it is no argument to say that implementing a social policy with its true costs in mind 
does not treat persons equally. As Dworkin astutely points out, social conditions of 
equality and a fair distribution of wealth undermine the reasons people have for denying 
responsibility and support the reasons persons have for accepting social and financial 
burdens caused by scarcity. To put this another way, under a fair social system in which 
wealth and power were distributed more equally, persons would be much more willing to 
accept discrepancies between their needs and their resources, and they would do so not 
simply as a compromise or as a result of coercion, but as required by justice.  
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 Third, Anderson convincingly argues that egalitarians ought to be just as 
concerned with the range of goods that fall within the purview of justice as much as they 
are with the pattern by goods or resources are distributed. Ultimately, in Cohen’s strict 
version, the choice/chance distinction leads to simple and clearly formulated rules: “when 
deciding whether or not justice… requires redistribution, the egalitarian asks if someone 
with a disadvantage could have avoided it or could now overcome it.”76 To be sure, 
Cohen concedes that though not a simple question, it is the right question to ask. But this 
is a causal judgement. Surely, as one type of judgement, causality has some public role to 
play. But the weight Cohen attaches to the choice/ chance distinction is clearly not 
warranted. Indeed, given that Cohen admits that a strict adherence to the cut breaks down 
any particular equilisandum, were Cohen to apply his rule of thumb to the kinds of 
situations addressed by Anderson, he would quickly see that causal judgements are 
applicable to very few problems of fundamental justice. Anderson is right to claim that 
causality is in general the wrong form of judgement for the distribution of goods people 
need as citizens. Most fundamental claims of justice concern the institutional 
arrangements of a society and, specific to distributive justice, the regulation of 
expectations and opportunities. I think there is some room in an egalitarian theory for 
causal judgements regarding responsibility, but Anderson shows that there is reason to 
place the choice/chance distinction within its proper context. As Matravers puts it, as 
citizens, “we are neither normally prepared to allow those who choose badly to bear the 
entire consequences of their choices,… nor are we such that we allow claims for 
compensation from people for any and every unchosen disadvantage.”77 Anderson is also 
right to insist that a more significant concern for egalitarians is to, “distinguish between 
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guaranteed and unguaranteed types of goods… and to insure individuals only against the 
loss of the former,”78 an argument that echoes Rawls’s claim about primary goods. But 
again, the virtue of Dworkin’s notion of opportunity costs is to press upon citizens the 
problem of fairness and scarcity even among primary goods deemed unconditionally to 
fall within the regulative authority of institutions. In other words, there is no reason to 
suppose that the state should not impose the costs of a social policy simply because of the 
kind of goods required by citizens. That is the context in which Dworkin’s theory is best 
suited, and contemporary political life is rife with these types of contexts. 
 So while there is good reason to reject a strict concern with brute luck as the 
proper object for a theory of equality, Dworkin provides compelling illustrations of how 
the notion of opportunity costs can transform the aims of a social policy. But if Anderson 
is right about the significance of the need of citizens for an unconditional set of goods, 
we need to look more closely at Rawls’s argument linking responsibility to primary 
goods as the measure for the position of the worst-off. Blake and Risse provide a good 
development of Anderson’s criticisms. According to them, and in accordance with 
Anderson, the significance that critics place on Rawls’s concern with undeserved, or 
arbitrary circumstances is in fact discontinuous with Rawls’s theory of justice. On Blake 
and Risse’s view, it is misleading to see Dworkin‘s normative aim as following from 
Rawls, as Kymlicka and Cohen argue. To get at this discontinuity, Blake and Risse put 
forward a distinction between direct and indirect theories of distributive justice. Where 
direct models take the problem of justice to be a fit between a measure of inequality - 
some currency of justice – and the correct grounds for its distribution, the indirect model, 
which Blake and Risse argue corresponds to Rawls’s theory, understands that the 
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equalization of some currency depends upon a broader understanding of justice. Blake 
and Risse argue that the exaggerated significance Rawls’s critics give to Rawls’s concern 
with mitigating arbitrary circumstances is mistaken. The direct and indirect models of 
distributive justice are incommensurable, “because in the one case we are talking about 
considerations pertaining to the basic structure to be decided in the original position, 



















4. Social Division of Responsibility 
 
 We are now in a better position to see the broader context in which Rawls’s 
notion of responsibility operates. I will not be concerned with whether Rawls’s account is 
correct, but with whether Rawls’s understanding of responsibility is deficient regarding 
the role of primary goods. First, and contrary to what many critics allege, Rawls does 
have an account of responsibility, which Rawls links to an account of primary goods. 
That account can be summarized as follows. Because primary goods are chosen as the 
currency in virtue of what individuals need as citizens and with regard to their being free 
and equal,  
the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for maintaining the 
equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair share 
of the other primary goods for everyone within this framework, which citizens (as 
individuals) and associations accept the responsibility for revising and adjusting 
their ends and aspirations in view of the all-purpose means they can expect, given 
their present and foreseeable situation.80
First, Rawls’s reference to citizens as a collective body contrasts sharply with Dworkin’s 
two mechanisms, which takes sensitivity to individual choice and circumstance as 
central. To the extent external resources can be tracked to individuals, having acted 
responsibly means, simply, that “no compensation is owed for disadvantages one could 
have avoided.”81 Individuals are to be held responsible for their preferences and choices 
made in awareness of the social consequences and costs to others. Rawls, on the other 
hand, determines three kinds of relationships, between citizens and the basic structure, 
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between citizens, and between citizens and state, which together produce what Rawls 
labels a ‘social division of responsibility’.  
 The choice of primary goods as the measure of inequality is crucial to all three of 
these relationships and generates a theory that is vastly broader than what luck 
egalitarians mean by distributive responsibility. Rawls, like Dworkin, agrees that we 
ought not to gain unfairly from the work of others. The difference is that where Rawls 
says we ought not to unfairly gain from the cooperative work of others,82 Dworkin’s 
claim is that the preferences of persons ought not to be subsidized by the work of 
individual others. Like the concern with individual responsibility, Rawls states that, 
“society is not responsible if individuals form goals they cannot meet with their share of 
goods.”83 In Scanlon’s words, individual responsibility means that “it is up to individuals, 
operating within this framework, to choose their own ends and make use of the given 
opportunities and resources to pursue those ends as best they can. How successful, 
unsuccessful, happy or unhappy they are as a result is their own responsibility.”84 Rawls 
and Dworkin deny that welfare or, in short, levels of individual happiness, provide a 
suitable basis by which to judge persons unequal. A sustained analysis of this claim is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For our purposes, it suffices to say that where Dworkin 
sees preferences as relevant internal resources to the extent that the costs of pursuing 
those preferences are imposed, Rawls dismisses preferences outright. 
 For Rawls, the choice of primary goods as the metric of equality means persons 
are completely responsible for their preferences, or overall happiness, in the sense that 
they are responsible for cultivating their ends with the expectation of a fair share of 
primary goods. It is because Rawls assumes that persons as citizens are capable of 
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revising their ends and preferences that they can take responsibility for adhering to 
principles regulating a set of unconditional goods. It is this sharp distinction between 
individual preferences and social primary goods required as citizens that, “individuals 
receive their respective shares of primary goods without needing to show themselves 
worthy or deserving of it.”85 In Dworkin’s scheme, individual preferences are 
transformed into ambitions when the true costs of their choices are imposed. However, as 
I have argued, not only is this aim theoretically impracticable, a strict demand for 
individual responsibility is far too specific, and indeed unnecessary, to serve as central to 
a liberal egalitarian politics.  
 To illustrate, the luck egalitarian concern with individual outcomes leads to the 
elimination of the influence of endowment on distributive shares. Yet, in one of her most 
pointed criticisms, Anderson “calls into question the very idea that inferior native 
endowments have much to do with observed income inequalities in capitalist 
economies.”86 As Anderson argues, most of the inequalities in resources that luck 
egalitarianism sees as arising from differences in natural endowments, “are due to the fact 
that society has invested far more in developing some people’s talents than others and 
that it puts very unequal amounts of capital at the disposal of each worker.”87 The idea 
that “to credit specific bits of output to specific bits of input by specific individuals 
represents an arbitrary cut in the causal web that in fact makes everyone’s productive 
contribution dependent on what everyone else is doing. Each worker’s capacity to labour 
depends on a vast array of inputs produced by other people - food, schooling, 
parenting.”88 This yields a very different understanding of responsibility that considers 
persons in their socially productive role. In fact, the demand for greater specification of 
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Rawls’s concern with undeserved, or arbitrary factors evidences the confusion Dworkin’s 
theory, and luck egalitarianism generally, exhibits toward the aims of social justice. In 
any case, that aim does not follow from Rawls’s egalitarianism. Under Rawls’s view, 
FEO, rather than eliminating endowments, gives individuals and groups a fair 
opportunity to use and develop their talents and endowments. Centrally, the point of FEO 
and the difference principle is not to eliminate or redress for all unchosen circumstances 
but rather to, “undercut the dominance the best-off groups have in replicating their 
control over economic and social institutions.”89  
 Given this much broader view of justice, it is not simply individual inequalities in 
resources that require justification. Like Anderson, Blake and Risse argue that the 
significance of resources to the lives of persons can be misleading: “distributive shares 
may become relevant, inasmuch as the economy is part of the basic structure - it is so to 
speak, a social fact, part of the set of things we as citizens make together. In order to 
justify what we do to one another through the basic structure, we have reason to ensure 
that we have some equilization of the benefits and burdens that basic structure creates. 
[Primary goods]… are ultimately the product of a political community that stands in need 
of justification.”90 That is why Rawls, in his restatement of justice as fairness, argues that 
the most fundamental idea in the conception of justice is the idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation over time.”91 Fair terms of cooperation address all three 
relationships within a political community, which requires the use of citizen’s two 
powers, the capacity for a sense of justice as well as the rational pursuit of self-interest. 
The inability of Rawls's principles to track individual shares is no argument against the 
democratic conception of equality because, “if inequalities arise because of unequal 
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starting points, they do so regardless of whether they are maintained by voluntary or 
involuntary actions.”92 It is precisely because any number of voluntary and involuntary 
individual actions may undermine the fairness of the relations over time and, hence, the 
reasons we have to revise our expectations in accordance with fair shares that institutions 
are the primary object of justice. In other words, the conditions under which it is rational 
to cooperate and which justify cooperative action in a political community are sustained 
primarily by institutions that are responsive to demands for justice. That is why 
institutions take precedence over distributive patterns regulating individual shares of 
goods. Absent a common and public set of reasons to cooperate, secured by a coercive 
institutional structure, fair terms of social cooperation cannot even get started. Political 
life is then governed solely by rational advantage.  
 Finally, criticizing the regulation of primary goods by the difference principle, 
Dworkin complains that the concept of the worst-off group is too malleable since we 
have to make decisions about who to include and how large that group should be. In 
particular, Dworkin and Kymlicka argue that because the difference principle, “fails to 
inquire whether individuals are among the worst-off due to their voluntary choices or due 
to unfortunate developments beyond their control,”93 the difference principle unfairly 
subsidizes some at the expense of others. We need to look closer at these criticisms.  
First, the difference principle is meant to shape inequalities of the basic structure, 
the purpose of which is to produce an overall tendency to equality and maintain 
conditions of reciprocity however individually responsible persons are for being among 
the worst off. From this perspective, corresponding to a social division of responsibility, 
“[i]ndividuals need not earn the privilege of benefiting from the difference principle, in 
 59
particular not through acting responsibly.”94 As Anderson points out, the inordinate effort 
given by luck egalitarians in sorting out the morally relevant features of persons, and in 
particular, the problem of expensive tastes as a fundamental problem of justice, is 
unwarranted and misguided: “It is not a moral accident that beach bums and people who 
find themselves slaves to their expensive hobbies are not organizing to make claims of 
justice on behalf of their lifestyles.”95 Indeed, according to Dworkin, it is precisely 
bbecause individuals will differ so widely in tastes, ambitions and conceptions of the 
good life that Rawls is led to primary goods, for primary goods are, “the only dimension 
on which they can, as groups, possibly differ.”96 But this trivializes the significance a 
lack of fair shares of cooperatively produced goods and opportunities has on the identities 
of disadvantaged groups as citizens. The difference principle, and a democratic 
conception of equality, is rightly concerned with fundamental cases of injustice and 
disadvantage, aims at justice among, rather than within, groups. As the history of 
democratic politics shows us, “The emphasis on groups reflects the historical context of 
the political struggle for equality, which has always been rooted in the demands of 
groups.”97 Groups generally self-define; only subsequently do the claims of 
disadvantaged individuals within groups become technical or statistical problems for state 
bureaucracies.  
Secondly, it is misleading to say that the difference principle does not distinguish 
among the worst off social positions. The difference principle may potentially result in 
some cases of unfair subsidization, but, as Van Parijs points out, “[a]mong individuals 
sharing the same social position,… actual lifetime performance in terms of this index 
[primary goods] can differ considerably.”98 In fact, then, we should expect variation 
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among individuals in shares of primary goods within the least-advantaged group, and the 
degree to which we ought to distinguish further among individuals of that group is in 
practical terms a bureaucratic matter of welfare policy, not a fundamental case of justice. 
In any case, Rawls is not concerned with each individual’s actual shares of resources but 
with the total lifetime expectations of social primary goods among disadvantaged groups. 
Moreover, because Rawls is concerned with inequalities in primary goods among rather 
than within social groups, “[t]here is no reason… to adopt considerations of 
responsibility with the intention of distinguishing among individuals covered by the 
difference principle.”99 Dworkin’s notion of opportunity costs does not depend on, nor is 
it limited to individual assessments of responsibility. In my view, Dworkin captures a 
fundamental problem of political justice underdeveloped by Rawls, namely, a fair 
assignment of the costs and burdens generated by the fair provision of opportunities and 
primary goods required by persons in their capacity as citizens. This, it seems to me, is 
why Cohen is right to say that Dworkin’s incorporation of the idea of responsibility has 
aided and, in my view, strengthened egalitarianism.  
  
 As we have seen, the two parts of Rawls's second principle, FEO and the 
difference principle, as well as an account of primary goods, provides for fair terms of 
social cooperation for the basic structure of a political society. The terms of social 
cooperation are characterized by three relationships: 1. among citizens, 2. between 
citizens and the basic structure and 3. between citizens and the coercive state. Rawls 
agrees that individual responsibility is significant but only to the extent that the pursuit of 
one's rational advantage affects a fair share of primary goods. A fair share of primary 
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goods ensures that citizens have reason to pursue their rational advantage fairly, that is, 
they should be provided with reasons to cooperate fairly and that is in part the 
responsibility of institutions to enforce as the influence of social and natural 
circumstances changes over time.  
 The concerns of luck egalitarians were not found to be fundamental cases of 
justice but were, rather, developments of Rawls's FEO. I argued that the formulations of 
luck egalitarians, and in particular Dworkin's resource egalitarianism, are in fact 
discontinuous with Rawls's democratic conception of equality. Although Dworkin's two 
mechanisms fail to express adequately the aims of liberal democratic societies, the notion 
of opportunity costs makes explicit the absence in Rawls's account of primary goods and 
social division of responsibility a corresponding account of a fair distribution of the costs 














 5. Multinationalism and the Basic Structure 
 
 We have examined at some length some of the implications of Dworkin’s auction 
and insurance scheme as a way of rendering clear a social policy that takes seriously the 
opportunity costs of its provision. Heath argued convincingly that Dworkin’s auction 
does not track equality, and I argued that it is quite ambiguous whether markets can track 
ambition and choice. In particular, it is not clear that the opportunities, expectations and 
resources generated by a competitive market are not questions of institutional design 
rather than individual ambition. There is one implication of Dworkin’s equality of 
resources that Dworkin’s critics have not considered, namely, the extent to which 
opportunity costs ought to apply to social primary goods. Specifically, Dworkin’s notion 
of opportunity costs brings into greater focus the costs of providing primary goods, and 
that even social primary goods may be subject to market forces. 
 Kymlicka argues that Rawls’s theory has radical implications that follow whether 
or not Rawls acknowledges them. Kymlicka attributes these implications to Dworkin’s 
theory of equality, which Kymlicka sees as a refinement of Rawls’s second principle. The 
main argument of this second section is to show that the choice / luck distinction is, at 
best, in tension with a democratic conception of citizenship and at worst, has little 
analytical force in resolving contemporary political conflict involving fundamental cases 
of justice. Indeed, Anderson’s criticisms can be seen as part of a broader debate between 
distribution and recognition. Distributive theorists, notably Brian Barry, have dismissed 
the significance of identity claims, instead emphasizing the fundamental significance to 
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equality of citizen’s socioeconomic conditions, a claim echoed by Tom Flanagan‘s 
analysis of Canadian Aboriginals. Even at first glance, however, this is an odd claim 
since, as we have seen, the most important primary good protected by Rawls’s two 
principles is self-respect and the sense of self-worth that one is part of a cooperative 
democratic social system. Even in the case of endowments, Rawls argues that it is not 
only impracticable but also harmful to the integrity of individual’s self-respect to deny 
the role of talents in shaping the opportunities and identities of persons.  
 As I will show below, Kymlicka’s work has challenged the scope of distributive 
egalitarian theory and his analysis of national minorities in particular provides a good 
case with which to develop the democratic implications of Dworkin’s notion of 
opportunity cost. As we will see, recognition theorists, or theorists of identity politics, 
need to take a closer look at the costs of culture as a primary good if their claims are not 
to be dismissed as expensive preferences or as violating fair shares. As the case of 
Canadian Aboriginals illustrates, the financial resources and social costs required to 
sustain equality in even fundamental cases of justice are enormous. These costs create a 
great tension between Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights and his defence of Dworkin’s 
distributive theory, a tension that is entirely unaddressed by Kymlicka.  
 Where Kymlicka distinguishes between immigrant groups and national 
minorities, I will, for the purposes of this thesis, assume that immigrant groups and 
citizen groups can be dealt with under the discussion of citizen politics. For the purposes 
of this argument, I will focus on Kymlicka’s theory on the rights of national minorities 
and, specifically, his characterization of the normative problems that arise between 
majority and minority cultures. Using the case of Canadian Aboriginals, I structure my 
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argument around five claims central to Kymlicka’s view: 
 1. Culture is a primary good; autonomy depends on access to a societal culture. 
 2. We need to break the link between nation and state or, as Tully puts it, the idea 
that the single-nation state is the only or best form of citizenship; in Kymlicka’s terms, 
the central idea is that citizenship is inherently group-differentiated. 
 3. Majority and minority nation-building are morally equivalent. 
 4. Cultural survival depends primarily on institutions run in a common language. 
 5. The opportunity costs of nation-building are unequal. The majority gets for free 
what the minority must pay for. 
   
 Kymlicka’s criticisms of post-Rawlsian distributive theory can be divided into 
three stages. Kymlicka’s early criticism was the inability to accommodate culture as a 
primary good. Kymlicka developed his view further to say that the debate over principles 
of justice is really a debate about the conditions in which autonomy is exercised, the 
rules, laws, norms, and practices by which persons are treated as equals. Kymlicka’s most 
recent view is that the terms of citizenship are primarily at stake in debates over 
distributive justice. As Kymlicka has argued, it is a mistake to view the aims of a political 
union in terms of a search for consensus on political or distributive principles or an 
abstract principle of liberty. The equal rights and opportunities that provide the 
conditions for the exercise of autonomy are secured by the institutions of a societal 
culture. As Kymlicka argues, the powers, benefits and responsibilities that come with 
rights are not distributed to just anyone, rather, “these rights are typically reserved for 
citizens,”1 that is, “to protect people’s cultural membership.”2 If autonomy depends on 
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securing the institutional terms of citizenship, then what matters crucially is access to a 
societal culture, specifically, the range of options made available by membership in a 
societal culture. It is clear that distributive theorists have misleadingly developed 
distributive principles solely in terms of either a world citizenry or nationally undivided 
citizenry. According to Kymlicka, however, if, “[c]itizenship…is an inherently group-
differentiated notion,”3 then, “distributing rights and benefits on the basis of citizenship is 
to treat people differentially on the basis of their group membership.”4 Kymlicka’s major 
claim is that it has become increasingly clear that the value of liberal autonomy depends 
less on a set of rights or distributive principles than crucially on the value of, “language, 
nationality, [and] ethnic identities within liberal democratic societies and institutions.”5   
 National minorities further challenge the institutional structure of a society, and 
its terms of social cooperation. In Kymlicka’s words, national minorities are, “historical 
societies, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, 
sharing a distinct language and societal culture.”6 In particular, national minorities are, 
“groups that formed complete and functioning societies on their historic homeland prior 
to being incorporated into a larger state.”7 It is clear that few if any societies are 
composed of just one nationality. Yet, while the idea of a multicultural society is well-
accepted, the idea of a multinational society is recent and highly contentious. According 
to James Tully, multinational societies are, “constitutional associations that contain two 
or more nations or peoples. The members of the nations are, or aspire to be, recognized as 
self-governing peoples with the right to self-determination.”8 However, what it means to 
be recognized as a self-governing nation is, by itself, ambiguous and varies among 
minority groups. Crucially, Tully draws a distinction between nations that seek to 
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exercise autonomy ‘internally’, by altering existing associations so as to be better 
accommodated or recognized, and nations that seek ‘external’ autonomy, by asserting an 
independent, single nation-state or through secession.9 To be sure, multinational societies 
are not “confederations of independent nation-states [or] plural societies of separate 
peoples.”10 Rather, the members of the independent nation participate in the political 
institutions of their own nation as well as the larger multi-nation.  
 Kymlicka argues that where a national minority seeks self-determination, or self-
government, majority and minority nation-building are equivalent. Indeed, Kymlicka 
argues that, “[t]he two seem on a par, morally speaking.”11 According to Kymlicka, 
national minorities have been overlooked as a fundamental case of justice because of the 
belief that equality requires identical treatment when in fact equality, “is derived from a 
prior commitment to the ideal of common nationhood.”12 The sense in which both groups 
are equal is that both, “want the right to decide for themselves what aspects of the outside 
world they will incorporate into their cultures,”13 that is, how they reproduce their culture 
over time. This is the specific sense Kymlicka gives to the idea of self-determination, 
which is of fundamental importance to equal nationhood. That is, once we see that the 
rights, liberties and distributive principles defended by liberals apply to citizens as 
members of a community, argues Kymlicka, we see that disputes over equality are 
derivative of a deeper dispute over nationhood. As such, in order to see that citizenship is 
consistent with a multi-nation state, we need to break, “the link between nation and state - 
to challenge the presumption that an independent state is the only or the best form for 
national self-government.”14  
 For those who defend the morality of individual liberal rights, however, minority 
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rights enabling groups autonomy violates an ideal of equality which says that citizens 
ought to be treated identically, as individuals, rather than on the basis of, say, race or 
ethnicity. In particular, minority rights are said to undermine the, “strict separation of 
state and ethnicity,”15 that individual rights and liberties have traditionally upheld. Mel 
Smith and Tom Flanagan each argue that minority rights allow precisely what a liberal 
defence of individual rights succeeded in eliminating, the belief that race ought to be a 
constitutive factor of self-government.16 Indeed, given the choice of accommodating 
minorities on the basis of race or assimilation, Flanagan argues that assimilation is really 
the better option.17 I don’t think accommodating national minorities as equals forces us to 
make race or ethnicity a constitutive feature of their self-determination. 
 According to Kymlicka, there is no strict separation between ethnic and civic 
forms of nationality because, “both ethnic and civic nationalisms have a cultural 
component.”18 So while, “[i]t is indeed one of the tests of a liberal conception of minority 
rights that it defines national membership in terms of integration into a cultural 
community, rather than descent,”19 the significance of a community to its members is to 
provide a range of ways of life, or meaningful opportunities in which autonomy may be 
exercised. Cultural membership in a liberal community does not depend crucially on 
whether a nation is civic or ethnic. As Kymlicka explains, “nations - civic or ethnic - are 
cultures that provide their members with meaningful ways of life across the full spectrum 
of human activity (economic, political, educational, recreational, religious, and so on).”20 
So equal autonomy, and the capacity for self-government, does not depend on the 
character or features of a peoples. What distinguishes a culture is its demand for separate 
institutions run in a common language. To make this distinction clearer, Kymlicka is 
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careful to distinguish culture from a societal culture. “Citizens of a modern liberal state 
do not share a common culture in such a thick, ethnographic sense. But if we want to 
understand the nature of modern state-building, we need a very different, and thinner, 
conception of culture, which focuses on a common language and societal institutions.”21 
A societal culture for Kymlicka is a thin, public basis for a common identity, or 
institutional basis for citizenship.  
As Simone Chambers points out, “Kymlicka explicitly emphasizes that lifestyles, 
religions and customs are not part of the societal culture,”22 nor does the concept include 
the family or non-public spheres of life. “Indeed, the institutions that Kymlicka mentions 
as forming part of the societal culture are essentially public institutions: government, 
schools and the media.”23 Kymlicka’s main point here is that the most important aspect of 
a societal culture is the operation of public institutions in a single official language absent 
which a culture cannot sustain itself as a societal culture; presumably, this includes 
securing the conditions for distributing the benefits and burdens of citizenship. This, 
more precisely, is the sense in which for Kymlicka majority and minority nation-building 
are morally equivalent. But the process of maintaining the terms of cultural membership 
through common institutions is not only a regulative process of securing or protecting the 
equal rights of citizenship. As Kymlicka points out, the societal culture that liberal rights 
promote ensures that state actions will not only differentially affect certain cultural 
groups but also, argues Kymlicka, potentially create unfair disadvantages.  
 
 In my view, Kymlicka’s insights properly complicate what is at stake in debates 
over equality and provide an important point of reference between recognition and 
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distributive theorists who typically have either looked past each other or disagreed 
outright with the other’s purposes. On the one hand, distributive theorists have not paid 
enough attention to the effect that the claims of national minorities might have on 
distributive criteria. On the other hand, many theorists of recognition either eschew 
distributive criteria or deny the significance of distributive criteria to resolving identity 
claims. 
. But we can already see that Kymlicka’s account of the relations between minority 
and majority nations is strained. This is due primarily to Kymicka’s claim that majority 
and minority nation-building are equivalent. It may be that citizenship is inherently 
differentiated, that the rights, liberties and distributive principles defended by liberals 
depend on membership in a societal culture. But to say that minority and majority nation-
building is morally equivalent begs the political question: how does self-government 
satisfy the demand for self-determination by a national minority within an existing 
societal culture? It is more accurate to say that multinational citizenship is consistent 
with, or not unreasonably connected to, liberal equality. Indeed, according to Tully’s 
definition of a multinational state, minorities participate in their own institutions as well 
as those of the majority nation. Kymlicka obscures the fundamental point that although 
the demand for national self-government in a multinational state adds to the complexity 
of the terms of social cooperation, even full minority self-government does not negate the 
obligations of a common citizenship with the larger society. That is, if participation in a 
shared set of institutions is to take place with status as a self-governing nation, the 
obligations of membership in a broader system of social cooperation and the distributive 
criteria that result normally from mutual dependencies under a shared and fair system of  
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social cooperation also obtain.  
 Asserting the morally equivalency of minority and majority nation-building leads 
to a truncated understanding of the distributive problems both nations must face and the 
range of solutions that are possible. The question Kymlicka’s insights lead to is whether a 
multinational citizenship also has any consequences for egalitarian distributive criteria, 
whether distributive principles apply equally, in the same way, to the nations of a 
multinational society. On this question, Kymlicka’s distributive criteria and his theory of 
minority rights conflict. Indeed, Kymlicka vacillates between a Dworkinian view that 
institutions be ambition, or choice sensitive, and a Rawlsian view in which national 
minorities have a claim to an institutionally secure societal culture as an unconditional 
primary good. In fact, however, neither approach captures what is at stake.  
 To demonstrate this claim, I will explore how the case of Canadian Aboriginals 
poses problems for Kymlicka’s theory of liberal equality. Canadian Aboriginals are a 
clear case of a society unjustly incorporated into a larger society whose legitimate claims 
for self-determination conflict with the kinds of distributive criteria analyzed in the first 
section. Specifically, I outline a string of recent Supreme Court cases that clearly link the 
identity of Aboriginal communities to the distributive benefits and burdens at stake for 
both Aboriginals and the broader Canadian citizenry, of which Aboriginal communities 
are inextricably a part. If egalitarian standards of political cooperation and distributive 
fairness cannot accommodate the demands of Aboriginal communities, then that is a fault 




6. Canadian Aboriginals 
  
 The constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights in Canada under The 
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(2), including Indian, Inuit and Metis, is clearly compatible 
with Kymlicka’s theoretical assertion of the significance of culture to autonomy, the 
ability to reproduce that culture over time. For the purposes of this thesis, I leave aside 
the claims of Inuit and Metis peoples, and focus on the claims of a dispersed and 
fragmented Aboriginal population. In Kent McNeil’s interpretation of that section, then, 
“[t]he term ’Aboriginal rights’ is used in Canadian law to refer to the rights the 
Aboriginal peoples have as a result of their existence as peoples with distinctive cultures 
and traditions, and their occupation and use of the lands prior to European 
colonization.”24 A brief history of several Aboriginal cases reveals fundamentally what is 
at stake in defining and implementing the terms of cultural autonomy within an 
established sovereign nation-state. However, the Canadian courts have in fact never 
addressed the issue of Aboriginal self-government directly. According to McNeil, the 
courts have, “been reluctant to embrace the concept of self-government, let alone accept 
that the aboriginal peoples have territorial rights with sovereign dimensions.”25 Indeed, 
the courts have treated title and self-government as completely distinct issues. As I will 
argue, analyzing the legal interpretation of those rights undermines Kymlicka’s 
unchecked assertion of a right to self-government on the basis of an institutionally 
complete societal culture. As we will see, a justification of the rights of minorities on the 
basis of autonomy reveals the inadequacies of distributive principles and criteria that 
have been aimed at regulating one or more of the three relationships distributive justice 
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deems individuals significant. Kymlicka does not consider these consequences at all.  
 Four understandings of what the Supreme Court labels the Aboriginal right, or 
‘interest’ in land can be traced historically through the major court decisions: historical 
occupation, Aboriginal law, societal organization, and customary practices. However, the 
core of the legal problem facing Aboriginals with regard to securing land for self-
government derives from two broadly competing perspectives on land title. The first sees 
land rights based in Aboriginal relations with Europeans; the second, views those rights 
as grounded in an understanding of property that distinguishes between pre- and post- 
sovereignty of the Canadian state.  
 The first acknowledgement under Canadian law of Indian rights to land is St. 
Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, 1888. Aligned against Ontario, 
the Canadian government and the St. Catherine’s Company asserted that Aboriginal title 
amounts to complete ownership except for a restriction on alienation, or sale of land, 
which is limited to the Crown. This view was rejected in favour of Ontario on the 
grounds that “Aboriginal title was based entirely on an interpretation of the Royal 
Proclamation which their Lordships regarded as the sole source of Aboriginal land 
rights.”26 The Royal Proclamation, establishing sovereignty on the basis of discovery, 
was thereby held to serve as the source of Aboriginal title. As such, Aboriginal land 
rights were established as usufruct rights, “the right to use and dispose of the produce of a 
piece of land without being able to sell the land,”27 a right dependent on the good will of 
the Sovereign. As Flanagan states, “[a]lthough the case led to an authoritative definition 
of Indian property rights, Indians were not involved in it and probably did not even know 
about it. Judicial interpretation might have been different if the aboriginal peoples had 
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had a chance to state their own understanding of property before the courts.”28  
 The first challenge to the doctrine of discovery as the source of title was Calder v. 
AGBC, 1973, “in which the Nisga’a people tried to obtain a declaratory judgement that 
their aboriginal title had never been extinguished.”29 In that ruling, the Nisga’a argued 
successfully that the legal right of Aboriginals to their land does not depend on whether 
title had been extinguished by or surrendered to the Crown: title does not depend on the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763, nor is it dependent on any other governmental act, including 
any claim to derive from European legal systems. As Judge Judson J. stated, agreeing 
with the Nisga‘a, “the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, 
organized in societies and occupying the land.”30 However, as McNeil notes, because the 
relevance of being organized and occupying the land was not explained by Judson, the 
shift in debate from the source of Aboriginal title to its content can be attributed to 
Calder.  
 In Guerin v. The Queen 1984, Justice Dickson drew on Judson’s unexplained 
assertion, interpreting Calder as having recognized title as a legal right deriving from 
historical occupation and possession of tribal lands. Ultimately, Dickson rejected the 
claim that the Aboriginal interest is best described as simply a beneficial or personal 
usufruct right, stating that the Aboriginal interest in land is a class or category of its own. 
This was the first articulation of the claim of a unique right to land, or sui generis interest, 
a concept that provided for subsequent Canadian courts the opportunity to explore 
beyond common law definitions of property. To be sure, though in Calder and Guerin a 
pre-existing right to title was accepted, the relevance of Aboriginal law to land title 
remained uncertain. In general, then, sui generis is characterized by a general 
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inalienability of land and the Crown obligation, a fiduciary obligation, to take up the 
Aboriginal interest in land should that interest be surrendered.  
 Nevertheless, the scope of sui generis has since been limited in two ways. First, in 
1980, Justice Mahoney, in Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs, held that the title of 
the Inuit plaintiffs, “was limited to a right to hunt and fish as their ancestors had done.”31 
effectively limiting the Aboriginal interest to uses of land at the time of Crown assertion 
of sovereignty. In Mahoney’s words, the common law, “can give effect only to those 
incidents of that enjoyment that were, themselves, given effect by the regime that 
prevailed before.”32 In other words, the right to the land itself is limited to the uses the 
land was put by a particular band at the time of contact with Europeans.  
 Second, Mahoney provided a four-part test for sui generis claims to title that is 
revealing of the significance the courts have attached to the notion of culture, what 
constitutes culture, and how culture attaches minorities to their land. One, in order to 
make the claim to title, it must be shown that the community and their ancestors were 
members of an organized society; two, the organized society must have occupied the 
specific territory over which title is asserted; three, occupation must have been to the 
exclusion of other organized societies; four, occupation must have been an established 
fact at the time sovereignty was asserted by England. For Mahoney, this test is a 
reasonable onus of proof demanding a minimal content necessary for legal interpretation: 
“there appears no valid reason to demand proof of the existence of a society more 
elaborately structured than is necessary to demonstrate that there existed among the 
aborigines a recognition of the claimed rights, sufficiently defined to permit their 
recognition by the common law upon its advent in the territory.”33 Despite Mahoney’s 
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confidence in it, this test is profoundly revealing of the difficulty of constructing a notion 
of culture that has clear legal and distributive implications. And though the sui generis 
right gives weight to the views of Aboriginals, the test appears to place the burden of 
proof on Aboriginals. Nevertheless, this test has since held up as a prerequisite for proof 
of Aboriginal title.  
 This interpretive problem carried over into Delmaguukw v. British Columbia, in 
which the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, both of BC, sought territorial title and recognition 
of the authority of traditional governments, thus pressing the question of the relevance of 
Aboriginal law to establishing title. The case went through three phases beginning in 
1984 and was decided by appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on December 11, 1997. 
In its first phase, BC Chief Justice Alan McEachern, in a blunt and highly controversial 
ruling, determined that land title and any governmental powers held prior to colonization 
had been extinguished by the inclusion of the province of BC to Canada; the right to land 
is usufruct. Yet, at the BC Court of Appeal, Macfarlane ruled that although governmental 
powers had been extinguished, Aboriginal rights to land title had not been extinguished. 
Macfarlane, developing the view of title as grounded in proof of social organization, 
concluded that land rights are specific to Aboriginal practices that the land supports and 
must be resolved case by case, depending on the specific Aboriginal society in question. 
Moreover, title is limited to the distinctive uses to which a society put the land prior to 
colonization. In other words, cultural practices that arose as a result of European 
influence could not count as distinctive; rather, “the common law will give effect to those 
traditions regarded by an aboriginal society as integral to the distinctive culture, and 
existing at the date sovereignty was asserted.”34 Again, it is noteworthy that MacFarlane 
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is willing to count as proof of distinctiveness those practices regarded by Aboriginals as 
integral. But the notion of an integral practice remains a very limited account of the role 
of Aboriginal law in determining the content of title requiring, moreover, a great deal of 
complex and controversial historical evidence. 
 However, Justice Lambert J.A., dissenting in part, and seeing further problems, 
took a more complex approach. An interpretation of rights that links a proprietary interest 
in land with its degree of connection to a distinctive cultural practice effectively denies 
Aboriginal societies, “the right to change and adapt to the new conditions which 
inevitably resulted from the process of colonization.”35 If this is right, MacFarlane’s view 
clearly undermines what Kymlicka argues is the fundamental justification for minority 
rights, autonomy, which depends on the ability of the members of a culture to determine 
over time their relationship to the outside world. Moreover, while Lambert accepted the 
view that rights have their origin in distinctive practices which precede sovereignty, 
Lambert rejected the view that title is necessarily tied to tradition, arguing that 
“aboriginal rights are evolving rights. They are not frozen at the time of sovereignty or at 
any other time. The evolution which occurred before sovereignty and the evolution which 
occurred after sovereignty are both relevant to an understanding of the rights.”36 In other 
words, if Aboriginal title is dependent on practices and uses of land distinctive to a 
particular Aboriginal society, any change to or adoption of a specific practice in response 
to European colonization and influence would no longer count that society as distinctly 
‘Aboriginal’, as having a distinct Aboriginal culture. Ultimately, Lambert concluded that 
Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions give rise to a right on the part of the Crown 
to protect Aboriginals in their exercise of their sui generis title to land, acknowledging 
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that the possibility of establishing title on the basis of a ‘right’, as understood by the 
courts and by common law, might in fact be impossible.  
 This appeal decision also was appealed and, on the basis of a completely new 
trial, overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada. Again, Lamer C.J.C. explicitly stated 
that this case could not resolve the question of self-government, but could serve only to 
address the content and proof of title. However, several important cases were decided by 
the Supreme Court between the second and third phases of Delmaguukw that had notable 
consequences for the final ruling.  
 In R. v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer developed a long-awaited test of proof 
for distinct practices, focusing the basis of title in integral customs, practices or traditions 
tied to land and ‘distinct’ to a community that need not be unique to that society.37 The 
problem at court was whether Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo in BC, had a 
right to exchange fish caught for money or goods. Here, the test for ‘integral’ is whether a 
practice  - selling fish - can be traced to pre-sovereign contact and whether that practice 
“was one of the things that truly made the society what it was.”38 On these tests, Lamer 
ruled that the exchange of fish for money was not found to be integral.  
 L’Heureux-Dube and McLachlin dissented from Lamer in Van der Peet, arguing 
that a focus on practices specific to a community was a narrow view of Aboriginal title. 
According to L’Heureux-Dube and McLachlin, it is the significance of the practice to the 
community, and the distinctive culture which such practices, customs and traditions 
manifest, rather than the activities themselves, that should be protected by Aboriginal 
Charter rights.”39 Further, and following from this, L’Heureux-Dube rejected Lamer’s 
opinion that the exercise of Charter protected rights depends on continuity with the past - 
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tracing a practice to pre-contact times - arguing that Lamer’s view effectively freezes 
Aboriginal culture in time in two ways. First, pointing to a distinction before and after 
sovereignty divides an Aboriginal society, effectively giving rise to the false notion that 
the authenticity of a culture depends on whether a practice pre-dates European arrival and 
assertion of sovereignty. Indeed, Lamer’s decision ignores the Sto:lo capacity to exercise 
their practices in ways that accord with crucial changes that occurred over time around 
them, crucially, the development of a commercial society. As L’Heureux-Dube argued, 
“aboriginal rights must be permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the 
needs of the natives as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the 
overall society in which they live.”40 Second, L’Heureux-Dube argued that such a test is 
useless because it is unlikely in any case that contact dates could accurately be 
established for any Aboriginal community. Not only would the relevant moment of 
contact differ between communities, but such a test unfairly places a burden of proof 
upon Aboriginals to demonstrate pre-contact exercise of a practice or custom. As McNeil 
pointedly argues, Lamer’s, “approach compels Aboriginal peoples to choose to live in the 
past in order to preserve their aboriginal rights, or to adapt to modern Canadian life and 
forgo those rights.”41  
 So how did these distinctions affect Lamer’s Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in the third and final phase of Delmaguukw? Lamer’s ruling addresses both the claims of 
the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en to inalienable fee simple ownership - the concept of 
property law upheld under Canadian and English common law - as well as the arguments 
of the governments of BC and Canada, that Aboriginal rights have no independent 
content, that any rights protected by the Constitution just are constituted by integral 
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practices. The final decision is in some sense a compromise between the positions of the 
two appellants. In Lamer‘s view, “[t]he content of aboriginal title, in fact, lies somewhere 
in between these positions.”42  
 Lamer argues that prior occupation is relevant to a sui generis interest in land in 
two senses. First, the physical fact of occupation provides an independent claim to 
possession before the assertion of sovereignty and shows, second, that there was a 
“relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law.”43 
Avoiding his definition of rights in Van der Peet, Lamer proposed instead that Aboriginal 
rights be viewed along a spectrum. The crucial point remains the connection of a practice 
or custom to the land. Lamer distinguishes between Aboriginal title, which is a right to 
the land itself, and independent rights which are practices, traditions, and customs 
integral to a society, but which are not connected to the land; that is, rights which are 
related to land but insufficient to support title. Indeed, the source of Aboriginal title is 
held by Lamer “to be grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal perspective 
on land.”44 In Lamer’s decision, the Aboriginal interest in land is not an independent right 
nor simply limited to integral practices, but involves, “a broad right to use the lands for a 
variety of purposes in accordance with the present-day needs of reserve communities.”45 
Lamer also made two changes to the test of proof in Van der Peet for satisfying a sui 
generis claim to title. For one, where occupancy was exclusive, occupancy overrides the 
demand that a practice must be integral. That is, exclusive occupation, rather than the 
connection of a practice to the land, is sufficient to make a claim, though this need not 
rule out joint occupancy. Two, it is sufficient to establish a practice at the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty, rather than to pre-contact times. This ruling, meant to take into 
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consideration both the common law and Aboriginal perspectives, gives as broad and 
generous an interpretation of the content of Aboriginal title as had yet been given. As 
should be clear, however, very little certainty was provided. As Tom Flanagan argues, the 
only guarantee for Aboriginal communities and government provided by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Delmaguukw is a long and continuing process of litigation.   
  
 Again, the aim of the above has been to get a summary but nonetheless clearer 
view of the complexity and significance of producing a definition of culture that has clear 
practical legal and distributive implications. The opportunities of Aboriginal communities 
to reproduce their practices and indeed their societies over time have been shown by the 
courts to depend to a great degree on putative links between culture and property 
interests. Not only have these interests been shown by the courts to challenge accepted 
and well-established concepts of property under common law, but as one justice 
remarked, it may be impossible to accommodate sui generis rights to land under common 
law. This cannot but challenge the distributive principles and criteria set out by Rawls 
and Dworkin and defended by Kymlicka. Moreover, though unstated, it should be clear 
that the cultural autonomy of a national minority potentially threatens the economic, 
social and political stability of the majority society. Indeed, no Canadian court has yet 
ruled on whether assertion of sovereignty extinguished the possibility of Aboriginal self-
government, or the independent authority over land and resources.46  
  The above analysis also shows that, although the empirical basis of Kymlicka’s 
claims is underdeveloped, there is no simple empirical or historical explanation of the 
link between Aboriginal culture and property interests that produces a clear 
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understanding of Aboriginal rights. In fact, as we saw, such attempts potentially create 
further burdens - burdens of proof - for already disadvantaged groups. An important 
conclusion, then, is that we should be wary of empirical generalizations about the content 
of culture that could be used to generate distributive principles and criteria across cases. 
In my view, we must look to the specific claims of particular communities. So although 
historical evidence may be available and hence of some aid, there remains a crucial role 
for normative analyses of equality. 
 At first glance, this conclusion supports Kymlicka’s focus on the significance to 
national minorities of institutions for their autonomy. Yet despite Kymlicka’s theoretical 
innovations, Kymlicka does not address distributive criteria that might resolve minority 
claims. One major problem is that the courts have held that Aboriginal title is essentially 
communal in nature, vested in an Aboriginal community as a whole.47 As Lamer ruled in 
Delmamuukw, “Decisions with respect to land are also made by that community. This is 
another feature of aboriginal title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal 
property interests.”48 Presumably, group-specific property rights limit the applicability of 
an ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive distributive criterion aimed at 
individuals. But does this mean we ought, with Kymlicka, to turn to issues of nationality, 
language and group-specific rights when dealing with the claims of minorities? Kymlicka 
comments that once we see that equality is a debate about nationhood we should expect 
that language rights would be the first thing theorists look at. But why does Kymlicka not 
consider developing further the implications of Dworkin’s notion of opportunity costs as 
a way of handling the challenges national minorities pose to Rawls’s distributive 
principles? An analysis of Supreme Court rulings shows, in my view, the urgency of 
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formulating rules and procedures for distributing benefits and burdens within 
multinational states. Adding urgency to the need for such distributive criteria is the fact 
that sui generis Aboriginal title, though not a full property right, is the only proprietary 
interest protected under the Charter. Indeed, would Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights 
justify a concern for Aboriginals such that they have the potential to override the 



















7. The Opportunity Costs of Citizenship 
 
 The case of Canadian Aboriginals undermines an ambition-sensitive and 
endowment-insensitive distributive criteria and, in my view, the centrality to distributive 
justice of the problems addressed by luck egalitarians. Specifically, it is clear that the 
circumstances of national minorities are not due to luck - brute or option - or endowment 
disadvantages. It is true, as Kymlicka argues, that Aboriginals were ‘involuntarily 
incorporated’ into the larger majority society. But the case of Canadian Aboriginals, 
which is a fundamental case of injustice, reveals the deep confusion of luck egalitarian 
distributive criteria. For it is perverse to say that the circumstances of Canadian 
Aboriginals are due to brute luck or to circumstances beyond their control. It is, 
moreover, deeply misguided to suppose that whatever compensation is due Aboriginal 
communities, they should be subjected to luck egalitarian standards of responsibility 
meant to apply to individuals. The relationship between national minorities and an 
existing majority society is more complex than can be accommodated by luck 
egalitarians.  
 The criticism I develop in this section derives from Kymlicka’s claim that 
minority and majority nation is equivalent, namely, that we should abandon the concept 
of liberal neutrality for a nation-building model. However, Kymlicka’s rejection of liberal 
neutrality overlooks two things, first, that problems of recognition can be addressed at the 
level of a multinational but, nevertheless, common citizenship. Although the claims of 
Canadian Aboriginals clearly challenge Rawls’s notion of fair terms of social cooperation 
for the basic structure, Kymlicka exaggerates what is required of equality in 
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accommodating national minorities. Second, the distributive criteria Kymlicka elsewhere 
defends are not consistent with the obligations of citizenship that support neutrality. 
Indeed, Kymlicka’s only mention of the opportunity costs associated with the 
accommodation of a minority societal culture is to say that the majority gets for free what 
the minority must pay for. This is a confusing claim. Presumably, Kymlicka thinks that 
the majority ought to provide for the social and financial costs of self-determination, yet 
provides no guidance as to what constitutes fair shares of the costs between majority and 
minority. Minority rights may provide national minorities with a degree for control over 
specific policy areas  But as I will argue, Aboriginal self-government is an institutional 
question involving the devolution of responsibility, authority and, ultimately, 
opportunities. Although these goods are a matter of the relations between cultures, their 
distribution is properly addressed by distributive criteria. So instead of abandoning 
neutrality altogether, I argue for redistributive criteria that address Canadian Aboriginals 
as citizens, that is, as equals, while taking into account responsibility for the opportunity 
costs of self-government. Overall, then, Kymlicka overlooks simpler and obvious ways to 
handle the challenges posed by national minorities seeking powers of self-government. In 
short, what we need is distributive criteria consistent with multinational citizenship. 
However, as we will see, it is not clear to what extent Aboriginal communities are at 
present capable of bearing the opportunity costs of self-government.   
 Central to Kymlicka’s defence of minority rights is that state action presupposes 
some degree of discrimination between ways of life. But as Kymlicka argued in an early 
paper, supporting and subsidizing some ways of life does not necessarily violate 
neutrality. Where in ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’ Kymlicka argues that, 
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“[s]tate neutrality ensures that the culturally subordinate group has as many options as 
possible concerning that interaction [with the majority],”49 he now rejects neutrality 
entirely for a nation-building model that views minority and majority nation-building as 
equivalent. Indeed, Kymlicka’s early claim was that if culture is a primary good, a 
theoretically productive distinction does not lie between perfectionism - the promotion of 
a specific conception of the good toward which citizens must strive - and neutrality - 
allowing individuals the choice of ends. The relevant distinction is between social 
perfectionism, in which individuals take responsibility for sustaining valuable ways of 
life, and state perfectionism, in which the state supports what otherwise would not 
survive.50 This formulation of the problem highlights the opportunity costs of sustaining a 
culture as a primary good, and provides a powerful conceptual distinction challenging 
defenders of a neutral state and starting-gate conceptions of EO.  
 But, highlighting the necessarily discriminatory actions of the state, Kymlicka 
abandoned this view. It is true that attempts by the state or majority culture to integrate 
individuals of different cultures into a single nation-state are bound to have differential 
effects on those individuals and cultural groups, which may create injustices for national 
minorities. On this basis, Kymlicka now argues that, “group-specific rights can promote 
equality between the minority and majority,”51 where there is a clear, “disadvantage with 
respect to cultural membership, and if the rights actually serve to rectify the 
disadvantage.”52 In one sense, minority rights might simply correspond to the ways(s) in 
which a national minority is disadvantaged, namely, “through such things as language 
rights, land claims, as asymmetric distribution of powers, and the redrawing of political 
boundaries,”53 as well as policy areas like education and immigration, “territorial 
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autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, 
language rights.”54 Indeed, part of Kymlicka‘s argument for minority rights is the 
rejection of the idea of state neutrality for a ‘nation-building’ model that, beginning from 
the idea that majority and minority nation-building are equivalent, asks, “whether 
majority efforts at nation-building create injustices for minorities.”55 That is, once we see 
the moral equivalence of nation-building for cultural groups, Kymlicka tells us, there is 
no reason to hold to neutrality: “[t]he real question is, what is a fair way to recognize 
languages, draw boundaries, and distribute powers?”56 Kymlicka’s work is important 
precisely because he has challenged the domain of goods that fall acceptably under 
egalitarian distributive principles and criteria. Kymlicka has provided one of the most 
thorough cases for including identity claims within the domain of distributive equality. In 
particular, Kymlicka denies that determining the range of goods significant to sustaining 
a meaningful societal culture can adequately be captured by consensus on a set of 
principles. We must look to the particular claims of groups in order to assess which rights 
rectify a given disadvantage.   
 So it is odd that elsewhere Kymlicka claims that, “[w]hether justice requires 
common rules for all or differential rules for diverse groups is something to be assessed 
case-by-case in particular contexts, not assumed in advance.”57 Here, Kymlicka does 
appear sensitive to the need for a set of common aims. The problem is that undermining a 
prior basis for deciding on neutral or differential treatment undermines the reasons we 
have to abandon neutrality for a nation-building model in the first place. Kymlicka’s most 
recent claim is that what has changed is the burden, or onus, of the debate over the rights 
of national minorities. It is no longer incumbent on those who advocate differential 
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treatment to demonstrate that their policies do not result in harm or unfairness; the onus is 
on defenders of neutrality to show that their policies do not harm some groups more than 
others. But this hardly counts as a guide to policy in the areas that Kymlicka has so 
clearly outlined as being relevant to debates over justice. The crucial feature of 
Kymlicka’s nation-building model is the ability of a cultural group to function as a 
societal culture, that is, with public institutions run in the language of that culture. But 
surely, while this may be correct, we need some way to assess the costs to each culture of 
self-government, a way to assess fair shares between cultures. Recall Dworkin’s analysis 
of the cost of endowment differences, that no amount of resources may be able to 
equalize all inequalities, and that the cost of full compensation may itself be an unfair 
burden. The problem is that there has been no discussion among theorists, policy analysts 
or the Supreme Court of the opportunity costs associated with minority institutions, 
especially among Aboriginal communities. This silence is inexplicable. Kymlicka’s early 
claim about culture as a primary good suggests that the problem is distributive, a problem 
of resolving the opportunity costs of sustaining cultural identity and practices. But 
Kymlicka’s present position asserting the centrality of institutional self-determination, 
deriving from the moral equivalency of majority and minority nation-building, is clearly 
in tension with the idea of minority rights enabling control over specific policy areas. 
 It is telling that although Kymlicka defends the normative aim of Dworkin’s 
egalitarianism, an ambition-sensitive and endowment-insensitive distribution, Kymlicka 
does not apply Dworkin’s two mechanisms to national minorities as a way of getting at 
the opportunity costs of minority rights and especially Aboriginal institutions that 
Kymlicka argues are central to the survival of a way of life. I have already pointed out 
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that the circumstances of Canadian Aboriginals are not meaningfully addressed by the 
negative injunction of luck egalitarians. The disadvantages faced by Aboriginals have 
nothing to do with endowment, brute or option luck. Although it is true that their present 
disadvantages are due to circumstances beyond their control, it is nonsensical and 
perverse to determine redistributive benefits by asking what level of compensation 
Aboriginals would have insured against being involuntarily incorporated into the larger 
Canadian state. This was precisely Anderson’s point: we should be concerned with 
Aboriginals because of the ideological and social hierarchy that has been deliberately and 
unjustly forced upon them.  
  Kymlicka appears to want to protect the right of minorities in specific areas of 
disadvantage by asserting the moral equivalency of their nation-building project to the 
majority. In Canada, this may be true of Quebec which has long used the federal division 
of powers to assert control over cultural opportunities under threat from outside. But 
Aboriginals do not have such institutions. Rather, the question is, to what extent ought 
Aboriginals have responsibility and authority over their own institutions? Moreover, at 
what cost to the majority ought such authority and responsibility be devolved? Kymlicka 
does not even consider this problem, which is better addressed by his earlier conceptual 
distinction between state and social perfectionism. Why does Kymlicka abandon the 
former method of resolving relations between majority and minority cultures?  
 In my view, there is no reason to suppose that distinct societal cultures within a 
multinational state cannot be dealt with by distributive criteria that address the terms of a 
common citizenship rather than as morally equivalent nation-building projects. 
Kymlicka’s earlier emphasis on the opportunity costs of culture as a primary good 
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remains attractive and appears to provide an unexplored way of resolving the institutional 
question of self-government that Kymlicka’s defence of minority rights, aimed at control 
over specific policy areas, does not accommodate.  
 To be sure, Kymlicka provides two characterizations of the problem that 
opportunity costs pose to majority/minority relations. In places, Kymlicka speaks of the 
cultural marketplace, that national minorities do not have the same opportunities as the 
majority to reproduce their ways of life. What is primarily required to achieve cultural 
autonomy in the contemporary world, argues Kymlicka, is a societal culture run by 
institutions in a distinct language. In other places, Kymlicka’s claim is that the majority 
culture gets for free what the minority culture must pay for. This points to the greater 
spending resources required by national minorities to sustain their culture as a societal 
culture. In either case, does Kymlicka mean that the majority should pay for the cost of 
the minority’s institutions? If so, why should this result in unlimited compensation by the 
majority? Indeed, Kymlicka’s defence of Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism was 
precisely that his theory provided a superior articulation of responsibility for choices in 
accordance with the costs of those choices to others. The question arising from the claims 
of Aboriginal societies is not simply, what is a fair way to recognize a range of goods 
crucial to a minority’s societal culture? Stated this way, group-specific rights provide a 
clear response.  
 But minority access to an institutional basis for the reproduction of their culture is 
a claim about self-government. It is odd that Kymlicka does not address the costs of 
minority self-government at all since he presupposes the moral equivalence of majority 
and minority nation-building and the significance of the institutional pre-conditions for 
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autonomy. An obvious question is to what extent the majority culture is obligated to pay 
for the costs of the minority’s institutions or, more precisely, the costs of self-
government. In my view, then, the distributive issue at the heart of a conception of 
multinational citizenship is that, “there has presumably to be some judgement made about 
how many additional resources it is reasonable to expend in order to keep open the 
possibility of a way of life.”58 Distributive criteria securing culture as a primary good 
need not be justified as neutral in the sense of producing a consensus the way Rawls 
supports his principles of justice. Indeed, this is inappropriate to Aboriginal communities 
whose disadvantages ought to be considered transitional. Distributive criteria should seek 
to spell out in publicly acceptable ways legitimate entitlements regulating the relations 
between an existing majority culture and the opportunities for self-government by the 
minority community in question.  
 Recall the account of responsibility Rawls embeds in primary goods. Because 
primary goods are things all persons need in their capacity as citizens, individuals are 
expected to adjust their expectations in accordance with a fair share of primary goods. 
The whole point of an account of primary goods is to provide a public standard against 
which persons can adjust their ends over time. However, it is not clear that a public 
standard of entitlement, by itself, can resolve the problems a national minority poses to 
the basic institutional structure of an existing society. This is significant because whether 
we conceive of the fair shares in terms of the institutional conditions of a societal culture 
or specific disadvantages requiring rights, there are enormous financial and social 
opportunity costs involved in accommodating Aboriginal self-government. As 
Kymlicka’s analysis of national minorities shows, the claims of national minorities 
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plausibly fall within Rawls’s concern with fair terms of social cooperation for the basic 
structure. This suggests distributive criteria that can mediate the relations between 






















8. Markets and Institutional Capacities 
 
 We have rejected the rationality of the insurance scheme as way of determining 
those costs. Tom Flanagan’s book First Nations, Second Thoughts, echoing Kymlicka’s 
distinction between social and state perfectionism, argues that Aboriginals ought to be 
subjected to the competitive pressures of the market. Flanagan provides a comprehensive 
look at the case of Canadian Aboriginals, taking seriously the idea that Aboriginals are 
responsible for the costs of self-government. Flanagan is sensitive to the fact that most 
Aboriginal communities are in no position to refuse government funding. But the level of 
economic development required for self-government is simply not possible in the short-
term, a point which Aboriginal community leaders ought to take seriously. More 
controversially, Flanagan questions the extent to which the members of Aboriginal 
communities are at present capable of bearing the opportunity costs of self-government. 
According to Flanagan, the socioeconomic conditions of Canadian Aboriginal 
communities are so dire that the economic development of those communities ought to 
outweigh any interest they have in preserving their culture. If Aboriginals wish to 
preserve aspects of their culture, they have no choice but to adapt to the demands of the 
market.  
 Flanagan has a point. There is a great disparity between the costs of self-
government and the socioeconomic conditions of Aboriginal communities. Moreover, 
absent certain attributes or capacities associated with functioning modern institutions, the 
financial costs of sustaining Aboriginal institutions will place an unfair burden on the 
majority - Canada. But Flanagan overlooks that the right of a minority culture to 
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reproduce on its own terms is linked to the terms of democratic equality as well as market 
costs. In the case of Canadian Aboriginals, democratic equality is not accurately 
characterized by competition but, in line with Dworkin’s account of autonomy, by the 
conditions for trial and error. In contrast with Flanagan, then, Kymlicka argues that the 
nature of institutional governance is intimately linked to the conditions of autonomy and 
identity in contemporary societies. But, as I hope to have shown above, Kymlicka’s 
emphasis on the moral equivalency of nation-building results in an underdeveloped 
analysis of the social and financial costs of devolving powers, authority, and 
opportunities, and unnecessarily limits the democratic concern with relations between 
cultures, the shared terms of social cooperation among citizens of a multinational 
democracy.  
Flanagan is very critical of the recommendations presented in the Report of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), specifically, the report’s conclusion 
that, “[t]he single most important factor in the medium term will be the restoration to 
Aboriginal people of fair shares in the lands and resources in this country.”59 Building 
Aboriginal communities through economic self-reliance is one of RCAP’s leading ideas: 
“The desire of aboriginal peoples to be self-governing political entities can be fully 
realized with a transformation in their capacity to provide for themselves.60 How, exactly, 
does RCAP propose that Aboriginals provide for themselves? RCAP stresses the benefits 
of Aboriginal regional economic development, citing four conditions for success: one, 
restoring control over and access to resources; two, developing enterprises, which means 
businesses act as collective owners and managers of natural resources and serve in 
partnership deals with investors; three, mastering professional and technical skills and 
 94
brokering employment, which means providing skills to work within an Aboriginal 
economy that can resist full integration into the general economy; four, relating income 
supplements provided by the government to productive activity. According to RCAP, this 
requires welfare reform and an end to funding without restriction so that better decisions 
can be made. 
 Flanagan argues that the focus on resources in the land is misguided. Natural 
resource industries are notoriously cyclical and prone to wide fluctuations in the world 
market. And while some wealth producing resources have resulted in very large cash 
flows to Aboriginal communities, the disparity between rich and poor within those 
communities, as well as an extremely disparate distribution of wealth among Aboriginal 
communities, far exceeds that in the rest of Canada. The reason, according to Flanagan, is 
that there has been little attempt by Aboriginals to use that wealth to support long term 
prosperity.  
 According to Flanagan, Aboriginal communities need to be opened up to market 
pressures and the inculcation of responsibility that comes from competition.61 The 
demand for compensatory funding on the basis of an unequal ability to compete in the 
marketplace, claims Flanagan, is unfounded. Simply put, no one is equal in the 
marketplace. This is a profoundly different view of the market than that put forward by 
Dworkin. The question is, however, to what extent the role of government should be 
reduced and Aboriginal communities subjected to market pressures, and Flanagan 
provides little guidance other than optimism about the benefits of market competition. To 
be sure, Flanagan is careful to point out that Aboriginals are not unfamiliar with market 
competition and indeed have a long history of adapting themselves to the outside world. 
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But the centrality Flanagan gives to market-induced accountability risks emphasizing 
self-sufficiency at the cost of a view to the mutual dependencies of cooperative market 
relations, the broader framework under which opportunities are generated. In other 
words, market competition by itself unnecessarily creates undue social costs.  
 The most interesting of Flanagan’s arguments is that, despite a complex cultural 
difference that needs to be recognized, there is a tension between traditional systems of 
Aboriginal self-government, and the capacities required one, to run the institutions of a 
modern government and two, to compete effectively in the marketplace in a way that 
sustains adequate levels of economic development. In particular, “kinship, if not the only 
factor, is a key one,”62 regulating political relations in Aboriginal communities. Kinship, 
or familial ties continue to regulate communities governed by a single entity - the band 
council - which is composed of unelected familial leaders and elite groups that have no 
accountability to members of the broader community. Given that Aboriginals, “openly 
acknowledge kinship as the main principle of politics.”63 Flanagan is very specific about 
the possibility that Aboriginals will be able to achieve the two aims successfully with the 
informal cultural norms they seek to protect. In fact, Flanagan argues, under no 
conception of a liberal democratic society is it legal or legitimate that a, “small group of 
elected politicians should have control simultaneously of people’s land, housing, schools, 
jobs, and social assistance.”64  
 In Flanagan’s view, the convergence of traditional forms of governance with 
modern bureaucratic institutions has had a very specific effect, namely, “structural 
features that encourage rather than constrain venality.”65 Flanagan’s point is not that 
Aboriginal cultures are especially prone to venality but, rather, the point well-developed 
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in political theory over the last several centuries that any persons manifest venality, 
“when they get a chance to pursue their private interests without constraint.”66 According 
to Flanagan, “aboriginal governments in Canada are beset with structural features that 
encourage rather than constrain venality, and… these structural features are so deeply 
engrained as to be inherent.”67 The point is clear enough: the success of Aboriginal 
institutions will depend on more than a common language. Given the contemporary 
conditions in which Aboriginal communities must operate, we have to take seriously the 
claim that, “in the long run, the economic base of Aboriginal communities will be a more 
important determinant of the viability and success of an aboriginal government than 
recognition as a sovereign nation.”68 According to Flanagan, then, if Aboriginals are to 
attain the economic conditions for self-government, Aboriginals will have to give up 
certain aspects of their ways of life, though “[t]hey may not have to give it up completely 
or all at once.”69  
 Flanagan’s rhetoric is inflammatory here, yet there is much evidence to support a 
greater concern for accountability and responsibility. As Franks points out, the bulk of 
employment in Aboriginal communities is government or government related. Whether 
in the form of public service, government contracts, welfare, or housing, “the [nonnative] 
government has become the dominant decision maker affecting the economic well-being 
of citizens.”70 Not only is the extent of government management of Aboriginal affairs 
remarkable, governments within Aboriginal communities are vastly overdeveloped in 
relation to the size of their populations and complexity of their economy. As a result, 
Aboriginal leaders have, “a much greater influence over its citizens than do the 
governments of comparably sized nonnative communities.”71 Adding to Flanagan’s 
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frustration is the inability of recent analyses to acknowledge this problem. For example, 
Flanagan points out, at the time welfare levels of reserve populations hovers around fifty 
percent of the population, with regional variations,”72 RCAP recommended an annual 
increase in unconditional spending between 1.5 and 2 billion more over five years.73 
Moreover, as Franks argues, despite recent cutbacks affecting nearly all social programs, 
funding for Aboriginals was one of the only spending areas that increased. Yet, “[t]here 
was little evidence that bands with greater economic resources were resolving their 
problems more successfully than those with lesser.”74  
 The point is that even though there is no cultural form democratic public 
institutions must take in order to promote accountability and responsibility, “[t]he liberal-
democratic political rights of representative and accountable government, of citizen 
participation, and of due process for guaranteeing these rights are a product of a literate, 
cash-based transactional society.”75 Most importantly, Flanagan attributes the staggering 
levels of welfare dependency among Aboriginal communities to their immunity from 
taxation, argued by many Aboriginals to be a perpetual condition of their relationship to 
the Canadian state.”76 According to Flanagan, the single most constructive reform that 
could be made within Aboriginal communities is self-taxation.77 Not only can taxation be 
used to promote accountability, a sense of opportunity costs and trade offs, but also to 
promote the effects of representative institutions, that members have a stake in the actions 
of their government.  
 Flanagan’s detailed account of Aboriginals in Canada challenges Kymlicka’s 
claim that equality is a deeper dispute over nationhood. As Flanagan asks: what does it 
mean to recognize a people as a nation, or a plurality of peoples as nations, when those 
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nations, “are viable only through the massive and continuing financial support of the 
federal government?”78 Flanagan’s demand for governmental accountability and fiscal 
responsibility are precisely what any Canadian, and citizen of a liberal democratic 
society, would expect from the institutions and officials, respectively, at any level of 
government. Flanagan is right that Aboriginal communities will have to adopt certain 
institutional characteristics and norms of democratic institutions.  
 Flanagan advocates a slow process of integration into the mainstream economy, 
and I agree. But Flanagan sees this as a way of assimilating and integrating Aboriginals, 
not as a way of promoting self-government. The problem is that market integration is not 
likely to lead to any better results than greater levels of unconditional compensation. 
According to Flanagan’s own criteria, if the market favours those with greater economic 
power prior to entering a competitive environment, Aboriginals are likely to fare worst. 
The significance of distinct institutions is precisely to develop the capacities within 
Aboriginal communities in a way that supports a transition into the market on terms 
acceptable to Aboriginals. This is not an argument for self-sufficiency. There is little 
need for Aboriginals to be able to participate in the market as self-reliant nations. On this 
point, the RCAP is correct: “A nation does not have to be wealthy to be self-determining. 
But it needs to be able to provide for most of its own needs, however these are defined, 
from its own sources of income and wealth.”79 Flanagan’s direct call for the benefits of 
market competition avoids the difficult analysis of the obligations of a common 
citizenship that sustains fair terms of cooperation for all members over time.  
 However, even as fierce an advocate of Aboriginal self-determination as Tully 
claims that while Aboriginals have the right to develop as independent communities, 
 99
“very few are in a position to govern themselves immediately.”80 How should we respond 
to this problem? In my view, it is clear that the Canadian government has not gone far 
enough, “in accepting the right of a self-government to make its own mistakes and then 
live with the consequences.”81 This, I think, is the appropriate sense in which to approach 
the cultural capacities of Aboriginals that figure in self-government. Consistent with 
Kymlicka’s account of autonomy, Aboriginals must be provided with the conditions for 


















9. Financial and Social Costs  
 
 I have rejected both Dworkin’s insurance scheme and market competition as 
appropriate for resolving the claims of Canadian Aboriginals. Yet, Dworkin’s notion of 
opportunity costs remains an attractive part of a conception of democratic equality. Given 
Kymlicka’s fundamental challenge to the basic structure, the significance of culture as a 
primary good and of a societal culture to sustaining that good over time, we need a 
clearer determination of fair shares, or opportunity costs. However, as Flanagan 
demonstrates, two main obstacles provoke concern about Aboriginal claims to 
nationhood: one, Aboriginals are among the least-advantaged socioeconomic group and 
two, there is sufficient evidence that Aboriginals are failing to bear the opportunity costs 
of self-government or, as the RCAP puts it, to develop the capacities to provide for 
themselves.   
 In my view, a democratic response to the circumstances of Aboriginals is an 
incentive structure that ties recognition as nations to a reasonably adequate level of 
socioeconomic and institutional development. I suggest the following criterion: in the 
case of Canadian Aboriginals, status as a participating nation with autonomous 
institutions in a multinational Canadian state should be tied to 1. a level of socioeconomic 
well-being that is not lower than the least-advantaged social position of the Canadian 
majority and 2. An institutional capacity to govern that can sustain that economic level. 
One consequence of this criterion is to decrease the level of funding for an Aboriginal 
community in accordance with self-generated income. This should create an incentive to 
adhere to democratic institutional norms and promote long-term thinking by community 
 101
leaders as well as a greater concern with efficiency. Where a community can 
institutionally sustain a level of economic development not lower than the least-
advantaged group of the majority of Canadians, self-taxation should be implemented. 
This criterion, I believe, addresses the concerns of both majority and minority while 
fairly taking into consideration the opportunity costs of Aboriginal self-government to 
each.   
 Aboriginal title, though far from settled, has been established increasingly in 
favour of Aboriginal communities. Yet, similar progress has not been made in the area of 
governance. Rather, the government has relied on vague pronouncements: “We expect 
that Aboriginal nations will exercise their powers incrementally as they develop expertise 
and gain experience. They will, however, have the right to exercise those powers and will 
control the pace of their own political development.”82 Though vague, this approach 
seems right. The problem is that the federal government appears unwilling to impose a 
reasonable incentive structure on the funding of Aboriginal communities. 
 In accordance with a democratic conception of equality, the concern here is not 
simply with the financial costs, but with the link between funding and recognition of 
status as nation. On this point, the RCAP recommends that 
The Parliament of Canada enact an Aboriginal Nations Recognition and 
Government Act to (a) establish the process whereby the government of Canada 
can recognize the accession of an Aboriginal group or groups to nation status and 
its assumption of authority as an Aboriginal government to exercise its inherent 
self-governing jurisdiction. (b) establish criteria for the recognition of Aboriginal 
nations.83
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Federal and provincial governments and national Aboriginal organizations 
negotiate (a) a Canada-wide framework to guide the fiscal relationship among the 
three orders of government; and (b) interim fiscal arrangements for those 
Aboriginal nations that achieve recognition and begin to govern in their core areas 
of jurisdiction on existing Aboriginal lands.84
  
 Why are these stated as two distinct problems? How can the standard for 
recognition of a peoples as a nation, when that status depends on a sound institutional 
structure, not be linked to the funding procedures that create those institutions? As 
Maslove et. Al. point out, “the major source of funding for Aboriginal communities are 
cash transfers from the federal government. There is no clear model that determines 
funding to all bands; ultimately, funding is adjusted at the funder’s discretion [emphasis 
added].”85 This seriously undermines the ability of Aboriginals to secure the conditions 
of autonomy taking into consideration the costs to Canada and to members of their own 
communities. The RCAP makes every effort to seek out opportunities for Aboriginal self-
government and economic self-reliance. But the report does not question at all that 
interim financing is at the discretion of newly created agencies and officials. Indeed, the 
RCAP recommends an Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunal, responsible for ordering 
interim funding.86 This is worrying because the RCAP seems to operate on the idea of 
identifying what needs to be done - and it is a very comprehensive report - rather than on 
how these aims are to be achieved. Not only does there not appear to be limitations on 
what could be done, distributive rules that apply to Aboriginals as citizens are not even 
proposed, but are without question left to the discretion of bureaucrats. 
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 While it is clear even to defenders of Aboriginal self-government is that, 
“methods of financing that are radically different from the current ones need to be 
envisaged.”87 It is very controversial what redistributive and compensatory benefits 
follow and how those are to be delivered. Regarding funding standards, Maslove et. Al. 
raise two important questions: first, what should the reference point be for equalizing 
each community? Second, how can the process be structured to ensure that equalization 
does not act as a disincentive on a community to generate its own economic 
development?”88
 Many authors advocate, “[a]n equalization formula like the one that exists among 
provinces.”89 As Alan Cairns points out, “Canadian federalism has a well-developed 
theory and practice of revenue sharing. The s.36(2) equalization clause of the 1982 
Constitution Act is singled out as a key vehicle for providing financial support for 
Aboriginal governments that, at least for the immediate future, will lack adequate sources 
of domestic financing.”90 Maslove et. al. also suggest taking the federal funding criteria 
used for provincial equalization into consideration: entitlements are inversely related to 
the wealth or resources generated by the Aboriginal community itself. I reject the idea 
that the funding scheme used for the provincial equalization scheme is adequate in the 
case of Aboriginal communities. There is too great an economic disparity between the 
various communities, and it is unlikely that a single funding standard or mechanism could 
be applied successfully to each of the nations since they are all at different levels of self-
reliance and development. For these reasons, the equalization criteria would hardly be a 
fair standard and as such, in my view, would create more harm and inequalities between 
communities. We need an approach that, “takes into account the context of a 
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community’s average income and wealth… relative to some non-Aboriginal standard that 
does not involve comparisons between Aboriginal and provincial governments.”91  
 For those Aboriginal communities seeking self-government, a standard for 
settling the opportunity costs is required. This standard should explicitly serve as an 
incentive mechanism that takes into consideration the opportunity costs of both sides in a 
way that does not violate the aim of Aboriginal self-government. The criterion I propose 
is in two parts. The devolution of responsibilities and authority taken over by an 
Aboriginal institution from a federal or provincial order of government must be 
reasonably tied to a level of economic development that is better than the worst-off of the 
majority and a degree of institutional complexity that can sustain that economic level. In 
effect, recognition of nationhood, in the form of powers, authority and responsibility 
devolved onto Aboriginal institutions, is to be tied to a standard of living roughly better 
than that of the representative least-advantaged group of Canadian society.  
 One criticism of this criterion is that it transforms the concerns of the difference 
principle for the lifetime expectations of the least-advantaged to a simple measure of 
resources, such as that proposed by Dworkin. My criterion takes into consideration more 
than what Dworkin has in mind in his resource egalitarianism. The criterion addresses the 
demand by national minorities for a societal culture, the institutional authority for the 
entire range of administrative, bureaucratic and distributive arrangements within 
Aboriginal communities in accordance with the norms and laws of Canada. In short, 
culture is considered a primary good. This fact also distinguishes the criterion from the 
equalization formula, which deals only with the sharing of financial burdens. Moreover, 
the criterion need not be sensitive to the lifetime expectations of minority groups for two 
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reasons. For one, the criterion need only be sensitive to the transitional process of self-
government over time. It is not a principle of justice or of permanent redress but serves, 
rather, a specific and limited purpose. Two, the criterion need not address an 
impracticable concern for the lifetime expectations of every Aboriginal community. The 
purpose is simply to enforce upon both majority and minority the significance of fair 
shares for those communities seeking self-government.  
 Another criticism might ask: How can Aboriginal communities become self-
determining economically if they are not already so politically? Is it not the case that 
political autonomy precedes, or is a pre-condition for, economic development? Why give 
priority to economic development over institutional autonomy? In fact, neither view 
accurately characterizes the criterion. The reason for tying institutional autonomy to 
economic development is to address the opportunity costs of recognizing and sustaining 
cultural identity within an existing multinational state. It is unfair for a minority to 
impose the cost of sustaining its way of life on a majority without limit just as it is unfair 
to deny a legitimate minority community the conditions for self-government. These 
conditions most crucially include a funding source and a reasonably democratic 
institutional structure.        
 Criticisms are better aimed at Aboriginal leaders and the Canadian government. 
From the perspective of Aboriginals, it seems antithetical to their own purposes that 
Aboriginals communities declare an inherent right of self-government as nations before 
they have working institutions or an economic basis to support the immense 
responsibilities of nationhood within and among democratic societies. Likewise, the 
reluctance of the Supreme Court to address self-government and of the government to 
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provide an incentive structure to the funding of Aboriginal communities undermines 
public acknowledgement of the title of First Nations. The two-part incentive criterion I 
propose does not diminish the claim to self-government as a nation, or community of 
nations, within the Canadian state, but does make explicit the social and financial costs 
between the three relationships identified by Rawls as essential to a democratic 
conception of equality. In particular, this criterion accommodates more clearly the 
common purposes of Aboriginals and Canadians as citizens of a multinational state than 
the solutions recommended by RCAP. As the RCAP states:  
The constitutional right of self-government does not supersede the right of self-
determination or take precedence over it. Rather, it is available to Aboriginal 
peoples who wish to take advantage of it, in addition to their right of self-
determination, treaty rights and any other rights that they enjoy now or negotiate 
in the future. In other words, the constitutional right of self-government is one of 






















This thesis has defended two main conclusions. First, I have rejected luck 
egalitarianism as an appropriate articulation of the aims of egalitarianism. Although 
Kymlicka, Dworkin and Cohen each see the views they defend as a refinement of and 
improvement on Rawls, Blake and Risse argue, in my view correctly, that a strict concern 
with the influence of arbitrary factors and individual choice is discontinuous with 
Rawls’s democratic conception of equality. Contrary to Kymlicka, then, it is simply false 
to say that Rawls seems not to have realized the implications of his theory of equality. I 
have argued that focusing on the voluntary or involuntary actions of individuals is too 
specific an aim to serve as central to liberal democratic societies. Rawls’s concern in A 
Theory of Justice is with distinguishing conceptions of equality for the basic structure of 
a liberal democratic society. Part of the aim of a democratic conception of equality is to 
mitigate the extent to which social positions and advantages as well as distributive shares 
are influenced by natural and social circumstances over time. In more specific terms, this 
means that principles of justice regulating the basic structure, ought to mitigate the extent 
to which specific individuals, whose undeserved circumstances might be used to justify 
greater distributive shares and political authority, may replicate over time their control 
over institutions.  
In the first section, I analyzed Rawls’s FEO and the difference principle, and 
rejected Arneson’s view that gives sole weight to a concern for the worst off and 
Kymlicka’s claim that Rawls gives centrality to the conceptual distinction between 
choice and circumstance. I argued that Rawls’s FEO is meant to distinguish a democratic 
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conception of equality from a meritocracy and starting-gate conceptions of EO, a 
distinction which concerns types of societies that fall within the principles of justice and 
the range of acceptable inequalities. The difference principle is meant to provide for a 
tendency to equality that does not undermine a fair share of goods among disadvantaged 
social groups. Moreover, as Anderson makes clear, under Rawls’s principles, citizens are 
entitled to at least one social position to which they can productively contribute. 
Although Rawls is clear about how endowment differences within the normal 
range ought to be handled, it is difficult to discern in Rawls’s theory features of the 
person relevant to a distributive theory of equality. Kymlicka picks up on this and uses 
this ambiguity to argue for two things: one, that the burden of endowment disadvantages 
unfairly influences the ability to lead a life according to choice and two, that the 
difference principle creates rather than removes injustice by subsidizing expensive tastes; 
the difference principle does not distinguish among individuals in the worst off position 
as a result of their choices. Both objections were argued by Kymlicka not only to be 
deficiencies of Rawls’s theory, but deficient by Rawls’s own standards. 
After outlining the two mechanisms of Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism from 
which Kymlicka derives his view, I responded to criticisms of the auction and the 
insurance scheme. I pointed to two ways in which Dworkin distinguishes his auction 
from a simple free market and from a starting-gate conception of EO, by applying a 
redistributive criterion over the lives of individuals - the envy test - and the notion of 
opportunity costs. Luck egalitarianism was found to be both impracticable and 
undesirable. It is not practicable to expect institutions to be able to track individual 
responsibility for their outcomes. Moreover, a strict concern with eliminating arbitrary 
 109
factors denies individuals the opportunities to develop their talents, skills and capacities 
required to protect the integrity of individual self-respect and identity within a system of 
social cooperation. Denying this feature of a democratic society is as unjust as ignoring 
endowment disadvantages. It is precisely because individual actions can undermine the 
reasons citizens have as a collective body to form responsibly their expectations and to 
sustain fair terms of social cooperation over time that an indirect theory of equality can 
be shown superior. 
However, although Anderson’s democratic equality makes clear the reasons we 
have for treating persons as equals, that is, as citizens of a cooperative scheme, 
Anderson’s institutional view fails in two ways. One, that view cannot rule out the worst 
socioeconomic cases that Anderson's examples attribute to the reasoning of luck 
egalitarians generally. Two, the institutional regulation of a set of goods to which citizens 
are unconditionally entitled does not rule out an understanding of opportunity costs as 
reasons pertaining to equal treatment. Contrary to what Anderson thinks, the application 
of opportunity costs to social policy does address the reasons we have for treating persons 
as equals, namely, that citizens as part of a cooperative scheme ought to be willing to 
accept responsibility for discrepancies between their needs and preferences, that is, for a 
fair share of social primary goods.  
The second main conclusion is that although Dworkin’s auction and the insurance 
scheme are far too specific to serve as central for citizens of a liberal democracy, 
Dworkin’s notion of opportunity costs improves upon the social division of responsibility 
in a democratic account of equality. In particular, I argued that Dworkin’s major 
contribution to egalitarian theory was to make more explicit the costs and burdens of the 
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provision of goods and opportunities that Rawls and Anderson deem socially primary or 
unconditionally regulated by institutions. Opportunity costs addresses more explicitly the 
tension between scarcity and fair shares affecting even social primary goods, which have 
not only a financial but also a social cost to their provision. That is, Dworkin’s notion of 
opportunity costs was found not to depend on individual judgments of responsibility, but 
has useful policy implications consistent with the democratic aims of equality identified.  
To defend these two main conclusions, I attempted in the second section to apply 
Dworkin’s notion of opportunity costs to a fundamental case of justice, Aboriginal self-
government. The circumstances of Aboriginals were found not to be adequately 
addressed by luck egalitarianism, but fall clearly within the aims of democratic equality. 
The first problem in illustrating the two conclusions was showing that the claims 
of national minorities for self-government are a fundamental case of justice. Will 
Kymlicka’s analysis of culture as a primary good or, more specifically, as a pre-condition 
of autonomy, has significantly expanded the range of goods deemed a fundamental case 
of justice. Kymlicka has successfully shown claims of recognition, or identity claims by 
national minorities, to be an under-theorized part of liberal egalitarianism. However, 
Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights is vague about the role of responsibility as a theory 
of fair shares that he so sharply defends in Dworkin’s distributive theory as being an 
improvement on Rawls. Specifically, I challenged Kymlicka’s claim that majority and 
minority nation-building are morally equivalent. 
An analysis of the case of Canadian Aboriginals, and especially the string of 
Supreme Court challenges, demonstrates one, that culture is not static but an evolving 
process of adaptation and two, that the claims of Aboriginal communities are linked in 
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complex and important ways to property. This link suggests that where Aboriginal title 
has increasingly been settled in favor of Aboriginal communities, the transition to self-
government requires some assessment of the opportunity costs, or fair shares among 
citizens of a multinational state. Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights is silent on this. In 
order to develop a distributive criterion, I identified as the primary good of self-
government the devolution of powers, authority and opportunities to minority institutions.
 Flanagan’s sharp criticism of the prospects of Aboriginal self-government, and 
acknowledgment of the financial costs of Aboriginal self-government to Canadians led 
Flanagan to embrace market forces as a remedy to the dire socioeconomic conditions of 
those communities. I argue, however, that subjection to market forces ignores obligations 
on the part of the majority Canadian government to support Aboriginal cultural autonomy 
and institutions. Flanagan’s most profound point was his interrogation of the status of a 
national minority that has not developed the capacities to sustain independent institutions, 
and whose continuing identity as a nation depends almost solely on the financial support 
of the majority government. Although the social costs, the threat to the social, political 
and economic institutions of the Canadian state of Aboriginal self-government, were 
found to be negligible, Flanagan provides sufficient evidence to warrant a strong 
incentive criterion that links status as a nation to the social and financial conditions of 
Canadian citizenship. I then proposed and rejected as insufficient a simple funding 
formula familiar to Canadian federalism, namely, the provincial equalization funding 
formula. Ultimately, I defended a two part criterion of justice that fairly considers the 
obligation to support Aboriginal opportunities for self-government and, reciprocally, the 
social and financial costs to Canadians. So while the claims of Aboriginal communities 
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for self-government, a fundamental case of justice, undermine the aims of luck 
egalitarianism, this criterion, rather than providing an independent argument for 
democratic equality, illustrates how the democratic aspects of Dworkin’s notion of 
responsibility might be applied to policy decisions in a way consistent with democratic 
equality. 


















































 1. Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction. 
Clarendon Press: Oxford. 1990. p.83. 
 2. Cohen, G.A. ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’. Ethics. Vol. 99, No.4, 
July, 1989. pp.906-944. p.933 
 3. Anderson, Elizabeth. ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics.  Vol.109, No.2, 
Jan.1999. p.287-337. (p.298) 
 4. Nagel, Thomas. ‘Rawls and Liberalism,’ in, The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge University Press. 2003. p.66, excerpted from, 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 1993. p.5-6. 
 5.  Freeman, Samuel. ‘Introduction. Rawls - An Overview,’ in, The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls. Ed. Samuel Freeman.  Cambridge University Press. 2003. p.3. 
6. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. The Belknap of Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1999. p.82. 
7. Michael Blake and Risse, Mathias. Two Models of Equality and Repsonsibility. 
The Equality Exchange: www.aran.univ-pau.fr/ee/. July 29, 2004. p.24. 
8. Kymlicka, p.56. 
9. Rawls, TJ, p.62-3. 
10. Ibid., p.64. 
11. Ibid., p.91. 
12. Daniels, Norman. ‘Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism,’ 
in, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge University 
Press. 2003. p.241. 
13. Mason, Andrew. ‘Equality of Opportunity, Old and New.’ Ethics. Vol.111, 
No.4, July, 2001. pp.760-781.  (p .778) 
14. Rawls, TJ, p.89. 
15. Ibid., p.92. 
16. Ibid., p.89. 
17. Ibid., p.56. 
18. Ibid., p.56. 
19. Ibid., p.81. 
20. Van Parijs, Philippe. ‘Difference Principles,’ in, The Cambridge Companion 
to Rawls. Ed. Samuel  Freeman. Cambridge University Press. 2003. p.216. 
21. Ibid., p.213. 
22. Rawls, TJ, p.61. 
23. Ibid., p.73. 
24. Ibid., p.348. 
25. Ibid., p.75. 
26. Ibid., p.87. 
27. Arneson, Richard. ‘Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity.’ Philosophical 
Studies. 93. 1999. p.77-112.  (p.83) 
28. Kymlicka, Introduction, p.56. 
 114
29. Ibid., p.70. 
30. Ibid., p.72. 
31. Ibid., p.71. 
32. Rawls, TJ, p.63. 
33. Cohen, p.914. 
34. Rawls, TJ, p.64. 
35. Kymlicka, Introduction. p.75. 
36. Ibid., p.74. 
37. Blake and Risse, p.22, exerpted from, Rawls, John. ‘Social Unity and Primary 
Goods,’ in, Rawls, John. Collected Papers. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 1999. p.371. 
38. Cohen, p.915. 
39. Cohen, G.A., Currency, p.939, excerpted from, Scanlon, Thomas. ‘Preference 
and Urgency,’ Journal of Philosophy. 72. 1975. p.659-60. 
40. Anderson, p.335. 
41. Kymlicka, Introduction. p.77. 
42. Dworkin, Ronald. ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.’  
Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vo.10, No.4 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 283-345. (p.343) 
43. Heath, Joseph. ‘Dworkin’s Auction’. Politics, Philospohy, and Economics. 
2005, 3(3) pp. 313-335. (p.328), excerpted from, Dworkin, Ronald. Sovereign Virtue. 
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England. 2000. p.149. 
44. Heath, excerpted from, Dworkin, Ronald. ‘Why Efficiency?,’ in, A Matter of 
Principle. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University Press. 1985. p.270. 
45. Ibid., p.326. 
46. Ibid., p.327. 
47. Ibid., p.326. 
48. Ibid., p.327, excerpted from, Dworkin, What is Equality?, in, SV, p.66. 
49. Ibid., p.329, excerpted from, Dworkin, What is Equality?, in, SV, p.84. 
50. Dworkin, What is equality?, p.332. 
51. Kymlicka,, Introduction, p.79. 
52. Ibid., p.78. 
53. Dworkin, What is Equality?, p.301. 
54. Ibid., p.299. 
55. Ibid., p.293. 
56. Ibid., p.293. 
57. Dworkin, Ronald. ‘Justice, Insurance, and Luck,’ in, Sovereign Virtue. 
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England. 2000. p.335. 
58. Dworkin, What is Equality?, p.294. 
59. Anderson, p.295. 
60. Kymlicka, Introduction, p.41. 
61. Cohen, p.928. 
62. Olsaretti, Serena. Liberty, Desert, and the Market: A Philosophical Study. 
Cambridge University Press. 2004. p.164. 
63. Fleurbaey, Marc. ‘Egalitarian Opportunities.’ Law and Philosophy. 20. 2001. 
pp.499-530. (p.521) 
64. Ibid., p.513. 
 115
65. Anderson, Elizabeth. Reply. The Equality Exchange. www.aran.univ-
pau.fr/ee/. 12/22/99. P.8. 
66. Dworkin, ‘Justice, Insurance, and Luck,’ in, SV, p.321. 
67. Dworkin, Ronald. ‘Justice and the High Cost of Health,’ in, Soverign Virtue. 
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England. 2000. p.309. 
68. Anderson, p.299. 
69. Ibid., p.303. 
70. Ibid., p.303. 
71. Ibid., p.309. 
72. Van Parijs, p.211, excerpted from, Rawls, TJ, revised ed., p.87. 
73.  Anderson, p.313. 
74. Ibid., p.319. 
75. Dworkin, ‘Justice and the High cost of Health,’ in, SV, p.313. 
76. Cohen, p.920. 
77. Matravers, Matt. ‘Luck, Responsibility, and the “Jumble of Lotteries that 
Constitutes Human Life’. Imprints. Vo.6, No.1, 2002, pp.28-43. (p.38) 
78. Anderson, p.327. 
79. Blake and Risse, p.45. 
80. Risse, Mathias. Rawls on Responsibility and Primary Goods. The Equality 
Exchange. www.aran.univ-pau.fr/ee/. p.33, excerpted from, Rawls, John. ‘Social Unity 
and Primary Goods,’ in, Rawls, John. Collected Papers. Ed. Samuel Freeman. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999. p.371. 
81. Blake and Risse, p.42. 
82. Rawls, TJ, p.96. 
83. Ibid., p.36. 
84. Blake and Risse, p.23, excerpted from, Scanlon, Thomas. ‘What We Owe To 
Each Other.’ Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. (no page number given) 
85. Risse, p.43. 
86. Anderson, p.325. 
87. Ibid., p.325. 
88. Ibid., p.321. 
89. Daniels, p.252. 
90. Blake and Risse, p.14. 
91. Blake and Risse, p.24, excerpted from, Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement. Ed. E. Kelly. Cambridge: Harvard Univesity Press. 2001.p.5. 
92. Risse, p.43. 
93. Ibid., p.35. 
94. Ibid., p.46. 
95. Anderson, p.337. 
96. Dworkin, What is Equality?, p.343-44. 
97. Daniels, p.242. 
98. Van Parijs, p.216. 







1.  Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1995. p.124. 
2. Ibid., p.125. 
3. Ibid., p.124. 
4. Ibis., p.125. 
5. Kymlicka, Will. ‘The New Debate Over Minority Rights’, in, Canadian 
Political Philosophy. Eds. Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman. 2001. p.159 -176. (p.162) 
6. Kymlicka, Will. Finding Our Way. Oxford University Press. 1998. P.132. 
7. Chambers, Clare. ‘Nation-Building, Neutrality and Ethnocultural Justice.’ 
Ethnicities. Vol.3, No.3. 2003. p.295-319. (p.312)    
8. Tully, James. ‘Introduction,’ in, Multinational Democracies. Eds. Gagnon, 
Alain-G. and James Tully. Cambridge University Press. 2001. P.2. 
9. Ibid., p.2. 
10. Ibid., p.3. 
11. Chambers, excerpted from, Kymlicka, ‘Western Political Theory and Ethnic 
Relations in Eastern Europe,  p.27. 
12. Kymlicka, Finding, p.142. 
13. Kymlicka, MC, p.104. 
14. Kymlicka, Finding, p.132. 
15. Kymlicka, MC, p.107. 
16. Flanagan, Tom. First Nations? Second Thoughts. McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 2000.p.47. 
17. Ibid., p.194. 
18. Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of 
Recent Work on Citizenship  Theory,’ in, Theorizing Citizenship. Ed. Ronald Beiner. 
State University of New York Press. 1995. p.133. 
19. Kymlicka, MC, p.23. 
20. Kymlicka and Norman, p.137. 
21. Chambers, p.304, excerpted from, Kymlicka, ‘Western Political Theory and 
Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Western)’, p.19. 
22. Ibid., p.304. 
23. Ibid., p.304. 
24. McNeil, Kent. Emerging Justice. Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and 
Australia. Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan. 2001. p.58. 
25. Ibid., p.101. 
26. Ibid., p.142.  
27. Flanagan, p.123. 
28. Ibid., p.122. 
29. Ibid., p.125. 
30. Ibid., p.61. 
31. Ibid., p.144. 
32. Ibid., p.144. 
33. Ibid., p.136. 
34. Ibid., p.138. 
 117
35. McNeil, Kent. 'The Meaning of Aboriginal Title,' in, Asch, Michael, Ed. 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equity, and Respect for 
Difference. UBC Press, Vancouver. 1997. p.151. 
36. McNeil, Emerging Justice, p.64. 
37. Ibid., p.67. 
38. Ibid., p.67. 
39. Ibid., p.67. 
40. Ibid., p.68. 
41. Ibid., p.70. 
42. Ibid., p.71. 
43. Ibid., p.104. 
44. Ibid., p.73. 
45. Ibid., p.72. 
46. Ibid., p.84-5.  
47. Ibid., p.89. 
48. Ibid., p.89.  
49. Kymlicka, Will. ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality.’ Ethics. Vol. 
99, No.4, July 1989. P. 883-905. (p.20) 
50. Ibid., p.14. 
51. Kymlicka, MC, p.52.  
52. Ibid., p.110 
53. Ibid., p.71. 
54. Ibid., p.109 
55. Kymlicka, The New Debate, p.166. 
56. Kymlicka, MC, p.113. 
57. Kymlicka, The New Debate, p.170. 
58. Miller, David. ‘Social Justice and Environmental Goods,’ in, Dobson, 
Andrew, Ed. Fairness and Futurity. Oxford University Press. 1999. p.159. 
59. RCAP, Vol.2, Restructuring the Relationship, Part Two, Chapter Five - 
Economic Development., 2. The Levers of Change, 2.1 Transforming Aboriginal 
Economies: An Overview. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sh73_e.html 
60. Ibid. 
61. Flanagan, p.133. 
62. Ibid., p.97. 
63. Ibid., p.97. 
64. Ibid., p.198. 
65. Ibid., p.94 
66. Ibid., p.94. 
67. Ibid., p.94. 
68. Franks, C.E.S. ‘Rights and Self-Government for Canada’s Aboriginal 
Peoples,’ in, Curtis Cook and Juan D. Lindau, Eds. Aboriginal Rights and Self-
Governent. McGill-Queen’s University Press. Montreal and Kingston. 2000. p.114. 
69. Flanagan, p.59. 
70. Franks, p.130. 
71. Ibid., p.131. 
 118
72. Ibid., p.181. 
73. Ibid., p.114. 
74. Franks, p.115. 
75. Franks, p.131.  
76. Flanagan, p.175. 
77. Ibid., p.107. 
78. Ibid., p.86. 
79. RCAP, Vol. 2. 
80. Tully, James. ‘A Just relationship between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal 
Peoples of Canada,’ in, Curtis Cook and Juan D. Lindau, Eds. Aboriginal Rights and 
Self-Government. McGill-Queen’s University Press. Montreal and Kingston. 2000. p.62. 
81. Flanagan, p.107. 
82. RCAP. Vol. 5. Renewal: A Twenty-Year Committment. Chapter 1 - Laying 
the Foundations of a Renewed Relationship. 1.A. A New Beginning. Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sk1_e.html 
83. RCAP. VOL. 2. Restructuring the Relationship, PART TWO,  Appendix A: 
Summary of Recommendations in Volume 2, Parts One and Two. 2.3.27. Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sh32_e.html 
84. RCAP. VOL. 2. Restructuring the Relationship, PART TWO, Appendix A: 
Summary of Recommendations in Volume 2, Parts One and Two. 2.3.26. Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada. http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sh32_e.html 
85. Maslove, Allan M., Carolyn Dittburner, Carleton University and Ian B. Cowie 
and Associates. ‘The Financing of Aboriginal Self-government’. Aboriginal Self-
Government in Canada. Ed. John H.  Hylton. Purich Publishing Ltd. Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan. 1999. pp. 392-410. (p.392) 
86. RCAP. VOL. 2. Restructuring the Relationship, PART TWO, Appendix A: 
Summary of Recommendations in Volume 2, Parts One and Two. Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada. 2.2.1.7  
87. Dupuis, Renee. Justice for Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples. Translated by Robert 
Chodos and Susan Joanis. James Lorimer and company Ltd. Toronto. 2002. p.128. 
88. Maslove et al., p.394. 
89. Dupuis, p.128. 
90. Cairns, Alan. C. Citizens Plus: Aboriginal People and the Canadian State. 
UBC Press. 2000. p.136. 
91. Maslove et al., p.392. 
92. RCAP. VOL. 2. Restructuring the Relationship, PART TWO, Appendix A: 
Summary of Recommendations in Volume 2, Parts One and Two. Indian and Northern 












    Bibliography 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics. Vol.109, No.2, Jan.1999. 
 p.287-337.  
 
Armstrong, Chris. ‘Equality, risk and responsibility: Dworkin on the insurance market.’ 
 Economy and Society. Vol. 34, No. 3, August 2005. pp.451-473. 
 
Arneson, Richard. ‘Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity.’ Philosophical Studies.  
93. 1999. p.77-112.  
  
--- ‘Luck Egalitarianism.’ Ethics. Vol.110, No.2, January, 2000. pp.339-349.   
 
Asch, Michael, Ed. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equity, and 
 Respect for Difference. UBC Press, Vancouver. 1997. 
 
Barry, Brian. Culture and Equality. Harvard University Press. 2001. 
 
Blake, Michael and Mathias Risse.  Two Models of Equality and Responsibility. July 29, 
 2004. The Equality Exchange. www.aran.univ-pau.fr/ee/  
 
Cairns, Alan. C. Citizens Plus: Aboriginal People and the Canadian State. UBC Press. 
 2000. 
 
Chambers, Clare. ‘Nation-Building, Neutrality and Ethnocultural Justice.’ Ethnicities. 
 Vol.3, No.3. 2003. p.295-319.  
 
Chandran Kukathas. ‘Are there any cultural rights?, in, Kymlicka, ed, The Rights of 
 Minority Cultures. Oxford University Press. 1995. 
  
--- ‘Responsibility for past injustice: how to shift the burden’. Politics, Philosophy and 
 Economics. Vo.2, No.2. 2003. pp. 165-90. 
 
Cohen, G.A. ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’. Ethics. Vol. 99, No.4, July, 1989. 
 pp.906-944. 
 
Daniels, Norman. ‘Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism.’ The 
 Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge University 
 Press. 2003.  
 
Dupuis, Renee. Justice for Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples. Translated by Robert Chodos  
 and Susan Joanis. James Lorimer and Company Ltd. Toronto. 2002. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. Sovereign Virtue. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 
 Massachusetts. London, England. 2000.  
 
 120
--- ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
 Vo.10, No.4 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 283-345.  
  
Flanagan, Tom. First Nations? Second Thoughts. McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
 2000. 
 
Flanagan, Tom and Alan Cairns. ‘Flanagan and Cairns on Aboriginal Policy’ Policy 
 Options. September, 2001.   
 
Fleurbaey, Marc. ‘Egalitarian Opportunities’ Law and Philosophy. 20. 2001. pp.499-
 530. 
 
--- ‘Equality of Resources.’ Ethics. 113. October 2002. Pp.82-105. 
  
Franks, C.E.S. ‘Rights and Self-Government for Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples,’ in, Curtis 
 Cook and Juan D. Lindau, Eds. Aboriginal Rights and Self-Governent. McGill-
 Queen’s University Press. Montreal and Kingston. 2000.  
 
Freeman, Samuel, Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge University 
Press.  2003.  
 
Gagnon, Alain-G. and James Tully, Eds. Multinational Democracies. Cambridge 
 University Press. 2001. 
 
Heath, Joseph. ‘Dworkin’s Auction’. Politics, Philospohy, and Economics. 2005, 3(3) pp. 
 313-335.   
 
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Clarendon Press; Oxford. 1990. 
 
--- Finding Our Way. Oxford University Press. 1998.     
 
 --- ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality.’ Ethics. Vol. 99, No.4, July 1989. 
 P. 883-905.  
 
--- Liberalism, Community, Culture. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1989. 
 
--- Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal theory of Minority Rights. Clarendon Press, 
 Oxford. 1995. 
 
--- ‘The New Debate Over Minority Rights’, in, Canadian Political  Philosophy. 
 Eds.Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman. 2001. p.159 -176. 
 
 
Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on 
 Citizenship Theory.’, in, Theorizing Citizenship. Ed. Ronald Beiner. State 
 University of New York Press.1995. 
 121
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. ‘Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility.’ Ethics. 
 Vol.111, No.3, April, 2001.pp.548-579. 
 
Maslove, Allan M., Carolyn Dittburner, Carleton University and Ian B. Cowie and 
 Associates. ‘The Financing of Aboriginal Self-government.’ Aboriginal Self-
 Government in Canada. Ed. John H. Hylton. Purich Publishing Ltd. Saskatoon, 
 Saskatchewan. 1999. Pp. 392-410.   
 
Mason, Andrew. ‘Equality of Opportunity, Old and New.’ Ethics. Vol.111, No.4, July, 
 2001.pp.760-781. 
 
Matravers, Matt. ‘Luck, Responsibility, and the “Jumble of Lotteries that Constitutes 
 Human Life’. Imprints. Vo.6, No.1, 2002, pp.28-43. 
 
McNeil, Kent. Emerging Justice. Essays on Indigenous rights in Canada and Australia. 
 Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan. 2001. 
 -p.59-101, Aboriginal rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial 
Sovereignty 
 -p.102 -135, The Post-Delmaguukw Nature and Content of aboriginal title. 
 
Miller, David. ‘Social Justice and Environmental Goods,’ in, Dobson, Andrew, Ed. 
 Fairness and Futurity. Oxford University Press. 1999. p.159. 
 
Olsaretti, Serena. Liberty, Desert, and the Market: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge 
 University Press. 2004.  
 
Parfit, Derek. ‘Equality or Priority?’ The Ideal of Equality. Eds. Clayton, Mathew, 
 Andrew Williams. Houndsmills: MacMillan Press: New York. St. Martin’s Press. 
 2000. 
 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. The Belknap Press of Harvard 
 Univesity Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1999.   
 
Risse, Mathias. ‘Rawls on Responsibility and Primary Goods. September 5, 2002. The 
 Equality Exchange. www.aran.univ-pau.fr/ee/  
 
Roemer, John. ‘Equality of Opportunity’. New Palgrave Dictionary. 2005. 
  
--- ‘Equality of Opportunity: a Progress Report.’ Social Chocie and Welfare. Vo. 19. 
 2002. Pp. 455-71.  
 
Sandbu, Martin E. “On Dworkin’s brute-luck-option-luck distinction and the consistency 
 of brute luck egalitariansim.’ Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. 3(3), 2004. 
 pp.283-312.  
 
Scheffler, Samuel. ‘Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality. Politics, 
 122
 Philosophy and Economics. 2005, vol.4, no.1, pp.5-28. 
 
Smith, Melvin, H. QC. Our Home or Native Land? Crown Western. 1995. 
 
Temkin, Larry. ‘Equality, Priority or What?’. Economics and Philosophy. 19, (2003), 
 pp.61-87. 
 
Tully, James. ‘A Just relationship between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Peoples of 
 Canada,’ in, Curtis Cook and Juan D. Lindau, Eds. Aboriginal Rights and Self-
 Government. McGill-Queen’s University Press. Montreal and Kingston. 2000.  
 
--- Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge University 
 Press. 1995. 
 
Vallentyne, Peter. ‘Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities.’ 
 Ethics. 112 (April 2002). pp. 529-557. 
  
--- ‘Equality, Efficiency, and the Priority of the Worse-Off.’ Economics and 
 Philosophy. 16, 2000. Pp.1-19.  
 
Van Parijs, Philippe. Difference Principles. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Ed. 
 Samuel Freeman. Cambridge University Press. 2003.  
 
Wolff, Jonathan. ‘Economic Justice. Prepared for Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics.’ 
 Ed. Hugh La Follette. Draft Four, April 2001.The Equality Exchange. 
 www.aran.univ-pau.fr/ee/  
 
--- ‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol.27, 
 No.2, Spring, 1998.pp.97-122. 
  
Internet 
Report of the Royal commision on Aboriginal Peoples. Indian and Northern Affairs. 
VOLUME 2  Restructuring the Relationship, PART TWO Appendix A: Summary of 
Recommendations in Volume 2, Parts One and Two. 
http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sha6a_e.html 
 123
